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ARTICLES
SOCIETY AND THE NOT-SO-NEW GENETICS:
WHAT ARE WE AFRAID OF? SOME
FUTURE PREDICTIONS FROM A
SOCIAL SCIENTIST
Dorothy C. Wertz, Ph.D.*
I. INTRODUCTION: "THROUGH A GLASS DARKLY"
The Human Genome Project promises to identify each of the approxi-
mately 100,000 genes comprising the human genome. It also promises to
"sequence" each gene, that is, list the order in which the four base pro-
teins are arranged on each gene, a list that may easily be 10,000 letters
long. The Human Genome Project ("HGP") probably will be completed
by 2006, ahead of schedule.' It may take another 100 years, however, to
figure out what each gene does in regard to the development and func-
tioning of "normal" individuals. Only then will there be widespread ther-
apeutic payoff from the project. In the meantime, there will be an
increasing number of tantalizing bits of diagnostic information, most ac-
companied by a measure of uncertainty. Therapies that replace, supple-
ment, or block the products made by malfunctioning genes, usually along
* Senior Scientist, The Shriver Center, Waltham, Mass. This Article was supported
by grant R01-HG00540-02 from the Ethical, Legal, and Social Implications Branch of the
National Center for Human Genome Research (National Institutes of Health) and con-
tract N01-HD-1-3136 from the Mental Retardation and Developmental Disorders Branch
of the National Institute of Child Health and Human Development (National Institutes of
Health).
1. For the estimated completion in 2005, see G.P. Schuler et al., A Gene Map of the
Human Genome, 274 Sci. 540, 540-45 (1996). The original estimate was that the genome
would be "mapped" (genes roughly located on the chromosomes) by the year 2000, and
"sequenced" (the order of the protein bases: adenine, thymine, quanine, and cytosine in
each gene identified) by the year 2005. See DANIEL J. KELVES & LEROY HARD, THE
CODE OF CODES: SCIENTIFIC AND SOCIAL ISSUES IN THE HUMAN GENOME PROJECT 30
(1992). For the original estimate of completion of both mapping and sequencing by 2005,
see Eric S. Larder, The New Genomes: Global Views of Biology, 274 ScI. 536, 536-37
(1996).
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the lines of drug therapy, without transferring actual genes from one per-
son to another will be developed.
As we enter this period of greater knowledge about genetics, we must
recognize the considerable fear the public feels every time the words "ge-
netics," "DNA," or "genetic engineering" appear. We need to ask our-
selves what really is new about the HGP and what, exactly, we are so
afraid of.
Two possibilities certainly are new: 1) we now can differentiate an indi-
vidual's genotype (underlying genetic makeup) from the phenotype (visi-
ble characteristics); and 2) we can make predictions about the health of
other family members on the basis of an individual's genotype. Even
though these possibilities may not be conceptually new, the HGP ulti-"
mately may provide greater accuracy. People long have believed that
they inherited health and other characteristics from their ancestors.
Human beings have used the family tree as a predictor, but cultural and
individual beliefs about the relative importance of different ancestors dif-
fer considerably from the scientific model.2 Mankind's belief that "things
invisible," as well as visible, shape our individuality and our fate also pre-
cedes the HGP. The description of these forces, however, may have
changed from angels, to chemicals, to genes. We have lived for centuries
with these unknowns.
What the HGP promises to do is to make the unknown known with a
"scientific certainty" that is difficult to refute, at least for those who be-
lieve in the power of nature to determine people's fates. The potential
horror of this certainty makes people shudder. Not only will they know
their own futures, but anyone else who has the information will have
some terrible power over them. Many Americans approach the HGP as a
sort of last judgment: "For now we see through a glass darkly; but then
face to face: now I know in part; but then shall I know even as also I am
known."'
This "genetic essentialism"4 is at the heart of people's fears about the
2. See generally Martin Richards & Maggie Ponder, Lay Understanding of Genetics:
A Test of an Hypothesis, 2-15 (Apr. 1996) (Center For Family Research) (on file with
author); Martin Richards, Families, Kinship, and Genetics, in THE TROUBLED HELIX: PSY-
CHOLOGICAL IMPLICATIONS OF THE NEW GENETICS, 249-73 (Theresa Marteau & Martin
Richards eds., 1996); STEVE JONES, IN THE BLOOD: GOD, GENES, AND DESTINY 378-82
(1996).
3. I Corinthians 13:12.
4. See generally DOROTHY NELKIN & M. SUSAN LINDEE, THE DNA MYSTIQUE: THE
GENE AS A CULTURAL ICON (1995) (showing the influence of genetic essentialism on
American popular culture). Genetic essentialism is the belief that we are our genes, or, in
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HGP, and 'explains in part why society has tried to set separate legal and
ethical standards for the use of genetic information, different from those
for other medical information. Yet, neither essentialism, nor most of the
specific ethical problems related to medical genetics, are really new. The
nature-nurture controversy began with Darwin and probably will never
be resolved, even after the HGP is completed. Efforts to explain crime
biologically have gone on for over a century;5 genes simply add a new
twist to deep-seated American cultural beliefs about "bad blood." The
discovery of hormones in the 1930s, and chemical treatments for schizo-
phrenia and depression in the 1950s, led to much discussion at the time of
whether all behavior resulted from chemical states, or whether there was
such a thing as "free will." It is questionable whether genetics will add to
these earlier discussions.6
Most of the specific ethical issues related to genetics were dealt with
prior to the establishment of the HGP. For example, many doctors and
families have grappled with difficult reproductive decisionmaking for
couples with family histories-of inherited diseases. Before carrier testing
and prenatal diagnosis, the majority of couples who had a child with a
genetic disorder chose to have no more children.7 Employment and
health insurance has been denied on the basis of risk for presumably in-
theological terms, that DNA is the goal, "a holy and immortal relic, a forbidden territory."
Id. at 41. See also Abby Lippman, Prenatal Genetic Testing and Screening: Constructing
Needs and Reinforcing Inequities, AM. J. L. & MED. 15, 15-50 (1991) (using the term
"geneticization" to describe the increasing use of genetic explorations from medical and
social phenomena); DOROTHY NELKIN & LAWRENCE TANCREDI, DANGEROUS DIAGNOS-
TICS: THE SOCIAL POWER OF BIOLOGICAL INFORMATION (1989) (describing changes of
genetic testing generally).
5. See generally ARTHUR E. FINK, CAUSES OF CRIME: BIOLOGICAL THEORIES IN THE
UNITED STATES, 1800-1915 (1938).
6. See generally CARL N. DEGLER, IN SEARCH OF HUMAN NATURE: THE DECLINE
AND REVIVAL OF DARWINISM IN AMERICAN SOCIAL THOUGHT (1991).
7. Carrier testing identifies people who carry one gene for an autosomal recessive
disorder or women who carry a gene for an X-linked recessive disorder. Called "heterozy-
gotes" (meaning that they have one gene for the disorder and one "normal" gene), those
who carry a gene for an autosomal recessive disorder such as cystic fibrosis have no symp-
toms of the disorder and usually do not know that they are carriers unless they are tested
or they have a child with the disorder. In order for a child to have an auiosomal recessive
disorder, such as sickle cell anemia or cystic fibrosis, both parents must be carriers. Wo-
men who carry a gene for an X-linked disorder such as hemophilia A on one of their two X
chromosomes also have no symptoms. (There are a few X-linked disorders such as fragile
X syndrome where women carriers may have symptoms, but these are milder than for
males.) There are no male carriers for X-linked disorders; males, having only one X chro-
mosome, are symptomatic. If a woman carries a gene for an X-linked disorder, each of her
sons has a 50% risk of the disorder. Presymptomatic testing identifies people who have a
gene for an autosomal dominant disorder if they live long enough. They are not called
1997]
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herited conditions. Insurers always have asked about family history. The
ethical issue of a doctor's disclosing false paternity goes back to the dis-
covery of blood typing. The issue of disclosure of medical information
about an individual to family members who may be at risk is probably as
old as taking the family history.
This Article will discuss the current status of each of these issues at
greater length. In considering the need for laws or regulations, it should
be remembered that the issues are neither new, nor unique to genetics,
and therefore should be considered in the general context of medicine
and the law of privacy.
II. A THIRTY-SEVEN NATION SURVEY AS BASIS FOR DISCUSSION
In order to provide a basis for worldwide discussion of the issues, my
esteemed colleague John C. Fletcher, to whom this Volume is dedicated,8
and I undertook two surveys of the ethical views of genetics professionals
around the world. The first survey, conducted in nineteen nations, took
place in 1985-86;9 the second survey, covering thirty-seven nations (in-
carriers because their asymptomatic stage is only temporary. Huntington disease is one
example of an autosomal dominant disorder.
Prenatal diagnosis identifies fetuses with chromosomal disorders (such as Downs Syn-
drome), unborn errors of metabolism (such as Tay Sachs disease), or major malformalities
(such as spina bifida and anencephaly). Prenatal tests are of several types. Some are
"screens" that identify women at higher risks: material serum alpha-fetoprotein (a blood
test), and the newer "triple test" (also a blood test) are examples. Ultrasound is another
form of screening (although sometimes it gives non-definitive results). Usually a screen
that is outside the "normal" limits requires a definitive test to get a diagnosis. Tests include
chronic villus sampling ("CVS"), which is an investigation of fetal cells taken from the
tissues that will later become the placenta, and amniocentesis, an investigation of fetal cells
that have been sloughed off into the amniotic fluid surrounding the fetus. CVS can be
done in the first trimester of pregnancy. Amniocentesis is done between 12 to 16 weeks.
The "screens" (blood tests and ultrasound) increasingly are being offered in all
pregnancies. CVS and amniocentesis are offered only when a woman faces an increased
risk, because of family history, of a genetic condition, advanced material age (35 or over,
which gives an increased risk for chromosomal abnormalities),"abnormal findings" on the
ultrasound or blood tests, or, in more instances, toxic exposures.
8. See Franklin G. Miller, Ph.D., Dedicatory Essay, 13 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. &
POL'Y, ix-xiv (1996).
9. See generally Dorothy C. Wertz, The 19-Nation Survey: Genetics and Ethics
Around the World, in ETHICS AND HUMAN GENETICS: A CROSS-CULTURAL PERSPECTIVE
1, 1-77 (Dorothy C. Wertz & John C. Fletcher eds., 1989) [hereinafter Wertz, Genetics and
Ethics Around the World]; Dorothy C. Wertz et al., Medical Geneticists Confront Ethical
Dilemmas; Cross-cultural Comparisons Among 18 Nations, 46 AM. J. HUMAN GENETICS
1200, 1200-13 (1990); Dorothy C. Wertz, International Perspectives on Ethics and Human
Genetics, 27 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 1411, 1411-56 (1993); John C. Fletcher & Dorothy C.
Wertz, Ethics, Law, and Medical Genetics: After the Human Genome is Mapped, 39 EMORY
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cluding the nineteen from the first survey), took place in 1994-95. Both
surveys were conducted through anonymous questionnaires describing
most of the ethical problems that occur in the practice of medical genet-
ics, usually presented in the form of case vignettes. We included all coun-
tries known to have ten or more practicing medical geneticists.1" The
anonymous questionnaires were distributed and collected by a geneticist
colleague in each country. In the 1985 survey, all questionnaires were in
English. In the 1994 survey, there were translations into Spanish, Portu-
guese, Chinese, Japanese, French, German, Hebrew, Czech, Russian, Po-
lish, and Turkish* In 1984, 682 geneticists responded, sixty-two percent of
those invited to participate. In 1994, 2,903 geneticists responded, sixty-
three percent of those asked to participate, including 1,084 in the United
States.
The 1994-95 survey included 499 board-certified primary care physi-
cians from the United States, including pediatricians, obstetricians, and
family practitioners, and 473 first-time genetics patients or their parents.
Both groups were asked about their ethical views before and after genetic
counseling and about the content of the counseling sessions. In addition,
each geneticist or genetic counselor was asked to report on the content of
these sessions. We also surveyed 988 adult members of the U.S. public.'1
All questionnaires covered the same ethical problems, though they were
phrased to accommodate the knowledge level of the specific audience.
Patients had a median of thirteen years of education. Twenty-eight
percent of patients were college graduates and thirteen percent high
school dropouts. In addition, ninety-one percent were women, eighty-
nine percent where white, and forty-four percent attended church at least
once a month. Seventy-five percent of the patients or their spouses were
in clerical, sales, service, or factory production occupations.
Because geneticists around the world face similar problems, the survey
was conducted internationally. Most geneticists agreed that if a service
were unavailable or illegal in their own country, they should offer pa-
tients a referral across international borders. Thus, it would make sense
to have some international agreement about what services should be
available and how they should be provided. Discussion can only proceed
L. J. 747, 765-809 (1991); Dorothy C. Wertz, Ethical and Legal Implications of the New
Genetics; Issues for Discussion, 35 SoC. SCi. MED. 495, 495-503 (1992).
10. See Table 1.
11. This Survey was made possible with the help of Roper-Stassh Worldwide. See in-
fra note 90.
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in the light of full awareness of international perspectives. In each major
section of this Article, international views will be presented.
In presenting our survey research, we do not mean to suggest that eth-
ics should be conducted by professional or popular ballot. Indeed, the
responses of the majority of professionals may contravene universal prin-
ciples concerning genetics. This is the case in many nations, including the
United States, with regard to prenatal diagnosis solely for gender selec-
tion.12 Thus, while surveys cannot tell us what is right, they do serve to
delineate the views of principal stakeholders.
Using these survey results, and earlier studies of genetic counseling,
this paper outlines some concerns that will be more fully expressed in a
book. In this Article genetic issues generally have been placed in the
context of the value system of the United States, using results from other
countries as a foil. From time to time reference will be made to overall
survey results, but specific statistics and tables will be provided
elsewhere.
III. THE FIELD OF GENETICS
In the United States, there are 3,070 professionals certified by the
American Board of Medical Genetics ("ABMG") or American Board of
Genetic Counseling ("ABGC"). The ABMG certificates include M.D.'s,
Ph.D.'s, and M.S.'s. In 1995, after the ABMG became a medical specialty
accepted by the American Medical Association, the Master's-level coun-
selors were certified separately by ABGC. Master's level counselors, full
members of the National Society of Genetic Counselors, number about
1,100 persons, including about 800 who are board-certified. All have
completed a special two-year postgraduate training program in genetics
and counseling at one of twenty-two genetic counseling programs in the
United States, two in Canada, and one each in the United Kingdom and
South Africa. Ninety-four percent of the counselors are women, with a
median age of thirty-four. Master's-level counselors provide most of the
pre-test genetic counseling and a substantial amount of the counseling for
those parents whose tests indicate the possible presence of a genetic con-
dition that could influence their procreative decisions. Ph.D.'s in genetics
12. Dorothy C. Wertz, Opinions des Ggngticiens de 37 pays sur la prdsdlection du Sexe,
28 SOCIOLOGIE ET SOCIETES 77, 78-80 (1996); Dorothy C. Wertz & John C. Fletcher, Fatal
Knowledge? Prenatal Diagnosis and Sex Selection, HASTINGS CTR. REP., May-June 1989, at
21. Genetic professionals may believe that in honoring requests for sex selection or offer-
ing referrals, they are respecting patient autonomy, but the principle of autonomy should
not always prevail with the principle of justice or equality.
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may conduct research or be responsible for laboratories, but many also
see patients and provide counseling. About half of doctoral-level geneti-
cists, both in the United States and around the world, are women. 13 In
the United States, ninety-four percent of all genetics services providers
are white. Only twelve percent have extensive experience with support
groups for those with disabilities.
There has been much discussion concerning the training of nurses or
certified nurse-midwives ("CNM's") to do genetic counseling. Several
graduate nursing programs exist for this purpose, but few nurses have
been trained in genetics in the United States.14 Genetic nurses play a
more prominent role in the United Kingdom, South Africa, and Poland.
In Poland, midwives do much of the counseling about prenatal testing.
Genetics services providers may be responsible for screening of entire
populations or groups, testing individuals or families who are known to
be at higher-than-average risk because of family history or advanced ma-
ternal age, genetic counseling, diagnosing children or adults, or prenatal
diagnosis. Medical genetics offers few treatments. It began as, and con-
tinues to be, a primarily diagnostic field. Initially the field of medical
genetics concentrated on reproductive counseling: the providing of ge-
netic information on which couples or individuals could base reproduc-
tive decisions. The counseling encounter was largely educational; this
gave the patient greater equality with the physician than occurs in most
medical encounters. Geneticists in North America and the United King-
dom, where genetic counseling originated, were hesitant to tell couples
what to do. This was the result of the recent excesses of the Eugenics
Movement, both in Nazi Germany and the United States. Genetic coun-
seling began soon after these excesses, in the late 1940s. In the 1930s,
counseling had been called "genetic hygiene" or "genetic advice."
In 1947, Sheldon Reed coined the term "genetic counseling" to replace
eugenically tainted terms.15 Reed believed that prospective parents who
13. Dorothy C. Wertz, Ph.D., Is There a "Women's Ethic" in Genetics: A 37-Nation
Survey of Providers, 52 J. AM. MED. WOMEN'S ASS'N. 33, 33 (1997).
14. Gwen W. Anderson, The Evolution and Status of Genetics Education in Nursing in
the United States 1983-1995, 28 IMAGE J. NURSING SCHOLARSHIP 101, 102 (1996).
15. Sheldon C. Reed, A Short History of Genetic Counseling, 21 SOCIAL BIOLOGY,
332, 332-39 (1974). Reed thought that people who were sufficiently concerned about their
potential offspring to consult a genetic counselor were usually above average in intelli-
gence and responsibility. The value of transmitting these traits outweighed the risk of
transmitting most diseases. Therefore, counselors should respect the potential parents
opinions. Sheldon Reed, Heredity Counselling, 1 EUGENICS QUARTERLY 47, 47-51 (1954).
Reed also argued that counselors should "try to explain thoroughly what the genetic situa-
1997]
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were responsible enough to seek genetic counseling would make such
good parents that they ought to have children, and he urged counselors to
support their decisions. In 1974, a committee of the American Society of
Human Genetics suggested "nondirectiveness" as the norm for genetic
counseling,16 thus diverging from all other medical specialties. It is un-
likely that there would have been such emphasis on nondirectiveness had
genetics begun as a pediatric or adult specialty outside the context of re-
production. In the future, as genetics becomes part of adult medicine and
as preventive measures or treatments become available, the field likely
will become more directive. Genetics may, however, retain the best ele-
ment of nondirectiveness, namely respecting patients as equal members
of the team in determining their own or their children's care. This is what
patients attending focus groups indicated as a priority.
17
United State's geneticists and counselors see a median of six genetics
patients a week, a number that appears small compared to the 100-150
patient median of the primary care physicians in our survey. Given the
small number of geneticists, this means that, in effect, most genetic infor-
mation, and probably most genetic tests, will be provided to patients by
their primary care physicians rather than by genetic specialists. Although
inevitable, this is worrisome in view of the gaps in knowledge, even about
tion is," but that "the decision must be a personal one between the husband and wife, and
this alone." SHELDON REED, COUNSELLING IN MEDICAL GENETICS 14 (1955). See also
Harold Falls, Consideration of the Whole Person, in HEREDITY COUNSELLING 99 (H. Ham-
mons ed., 1959) (encouraging such superior parents to have children if the gene to be
transmitted did not impose too serious a hardship); C. Nash Herndon, Heredity Counsel-
ling, 1 EUGENICS QUARTERLY 64, 64-66 (1954) (believed couples should be evaluated in
terms of "total genetic potential," not just the single gene).
16. F. Clarke Fraser, Genetic Counseling, 26 AM. J. HUMAN GENETICS 636, 636-61
(1974). The classic meaning of nondirectiveness, as described by Fraser in 1974, included
the following elements: suggesting that while you will not make decisions for patients you
will support any they make; telling patients that decisions, especially reproductive ones, are
theirs alone and refusing to make any for them; helping individuals/couples understand
their options and the present state of medical knowledge so they can make informed deci-
sions; helping individuals/couples adjust to and cope with their genetic problems; the re-
moval or lessening of patient guilt or anxiety; and helping individuals/couples achieve their
parenting goals. From 97 to 100% of U.S. geneticists in the 1984 survey agreed with these
elements. Wertz, Genetic and Ethics Around the World, supra note 9, at 34, 35.
Many counselors believe that this type of nondirectiveness is not possible. See, e.g., Sey-
mour Kessler, Psychological Aspects of Genetic Counselling, VII Thoughts on Directive-
ness, 1 J. GENETIC COUNSELLING 9, 9-18 (1992).
17. Dorothy C. Wertz, Ph.D. & Robin Gregg, Ph.D., M.S.W., Optimizing Genetics
Services in a Social, Ethical, and Policy Context: Suggestions from Consumers and Provid-
ers in the New England Regional Genetics Group (NERGG), 10 GENETIC RESOURCE 1, 9-
11 (1996).
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relatively common genetic disorders, among the primary care physicians
in our sample. Although most physicians got most things right on a
knowledge quiz that was incorporated in our survey, some gave incorrect
answers to questions of considerable importance to patients. For exam-
ple, eleven percent thought that most children with Downs syndrome
could complete regular (not special) high school; the majority thought
that males with cystic fibrosis could father biological children (they are
actually sterile); and fifty-two percent thought that "trisomy 52," a trick
question, was prenatally diagnosable.
IV. GENETIC ESSENTIALISM: PRYING INTO THE SOUL?
Public fears about genetics are of a greater magnitude than those that
accompanied previous, largely academic, discussions about the biochemi-
cal basis of the self associated with discoveries of chemical treatments for
mental illness. People think that geneticists have uncovered the ultimate
building blocks that make us what we are. The horror implicit in this
point of view, unless one has a religious view of the soul, is that perhaps
we are the sum of our genes and nothing more, and that science may now
tell each of us exactly what we are and what we will become. This essen-
tialistic view pervades popular culture. "I am my genes" is a phrase con-
stantly used by questioners at public forums, despite the efforts of
panelists to try to explain that "you" are not the same as "your genes."
This "genetic essentialism," variously expressed as "good or bad blood,"
the Jukes and Kallikak families, Social Darwinism, or racial superiority/
inferiority, has dominated over environmental views in America for over
100 years. According to Dorothy Nelkin, there were only two periods
when environmental views had at least equal weight with genetic essen-
tialism.18 The first was during the Great Depression of the 1930s, when
middle-class people, themselves out of jobs, realized that other people
were out of jobs through no fault of their own. The second period was
immediately after World War II, when the eugenics movement was dis-
credited because of the Nazis. In this period, social scientists believed
that crime and mental illness could be prevented by proper nurturing in a
two-parent nuclear family, with each parent fulfilling a prescribed gender
role. Usually the mother was blamed if something went wrong. 19 Many
18. NELKIN & LINDEE, supra note 4, at 33-34.
19. See generally BETTY FRIEDAN, THE FEMININE MYSTIQUE (1963) (describing
mother blaming); FERDINAND LUNDBERG & MARYNIA F. FARNHAM, M.D., MODERN WO-
MAN: THE LOST SEX 270-271, 291-294 (1947) (purporting to be a psychiatric analysis of the
woes of women who desert their true feminine and mothering roles); PHYLISS CHESLER,
1997]
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mothers undoubtedly were relieved to see a return to biologically based
thinking, because this absolved them from blame. Mothers again faced
blame, however, when genetic information and new reproductive tech-
nologies placed difficult new choices on the parents.
Genetic essentialism has received more attention in recent years.
Court decisions concerning child custody have given biological relation-
ships more weight than the more traditional "best interests of the child."
Thus, the courts have seemed to imply that there is something sacred
about biology.2 0 Couples whose embryos are carried by "surrogate
mothers" have been declared the infant's parents on birth certificates,
simply by virtue of their biological relationship. This fundamental view
that we attach to biology and genetics is helping to determine our cultural
view of genetic privacy, genetic disclosure, and genetic autonomy as
somehow separate from other kinds of privacy, disclosure, and autonomy.
V. THINGS VISIBLE AND INVISIBLE: DOES GENETICS REQUIRE A NEW
CONCEPT OF PRIVACY?
Around the world, insurance companies and employers are widely mis-
trusted by employees. Questions regarding their access to genetic infor-
mation received the strongest consensus of all questions on our fifty-page
questionnaire: virtually one-hundred percent of the geneticists in all
thirty-seven nations, of U.S. primary care physicians, of patients, and of
the U.S. public thought that employers and insurers should not have any
access to genetic information without an individual's consent. Close to
one-half of the respondents in each category thought that insurance com-
panies and employers should have no access at all, even if the individual
consents. It is unclear whether these responses resulted from particular
feelings about genetic information or whether they resulted from an over-
whelming distrust of insurers and employers. Human Immunodeficiency
Virus, listed among a group of genetic conditions, received the same
response.
There were fewer reports of refusals of insurance or employment on
genetic grounds than we expected. In all, the 1,084 U.S. geneticists re-
ported a total of about 550 individuals who were refused employment, let
WOMEN & MADNESS (1972) (explaining why these oppressive, feminine roles drive women
to mental illness). For success in reducing the likelihood of complications in the newborn
to less than one percent, see, e.g., STEVEN G. GABLE, OBSTETRICS: NORMAL AND PROBLEM
PREGNANCIES 962 (2d ed., 1992).
20. See Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss & Dorothy Nelkin, The Jurisprudence of Genetics,
45 VAND. L. REV. 313, 324 (1992).
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go from a job, or were refused life insurance on the basis of either being a
carrier or having a genetic predisposition for disease or a disabling condi-
tion in the absence of symptoms. Most people would consider such refus-
als unfair discrimination, however, because carriers do not always
develop the genetic condition. People with predispositions for cancer or
heart disease, for example, may never develop the condition. In view of
the fact that the 1,084 U.S. geneticists had a median of nine years experi-
ence, and saw a median of six patients per week, 550 such reports seem
few. Many geneticists see-.their patients only once though, and sessions
tend to concentrate on medical issues; therefore, it may be that genetics
professionals are unaware of the concerns and risks facing their "clients"
in a wider social context.
Primary care physicians in the United States, who see 100-150 patients
per week and are likely to see their patients on an ongoing basis, reported
only a few instances of refusals of employment or life or health insurance
based on genetic information. There were a handful of reports from Can-
ada. Geneticists in other nations seemed to think that such problems
could occur only in the United States, because laws in their own countries
protected the individual's right to work. Note that we did not ask about
health insurance on the geneticist survey, because most industrialized na-
tions have national health plans.
Survey questions for patients did not mention carrier status or predis-
position, but simply asked "because of a genetic disability or disease,
have you or a member of your family been refused.. . ." Approximately
two percent stated they were refused employment, four percent health
insurance, and six percent life insurance. Patients' explanations sug-
gested. that at least some of these refusals were justifiable, such as being
denied a job as a firefighter on account of chronic bronchitis. We did not
ask how many patients had applied for life insurance or for individually
rated health insurance, as opposed to employer packages, which cannot
exclude individuals. Therefore, we do not know what percent of those
who actually applied for insurance were refused.
Among the general public, three percent reported being refused em-
ployment or fired from a job, three percent reported being refused health
insurance, and five percent reported being refused life insurance "be-
cause of an inherited disease or condition." The percentages of reported
insurance refusals approximates the overall percentage of insurance re-
fusal. Thus, it is not clear from the data that genetics is a separate, or
even a major, cause for such refusals.
19971
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Another study found far greater evidence of "genetic discrimination"
by looking at select groups of experienced, college-educated consumers
in genetic support groups.21 Perceptions of "discrimination," however,
may depend on the social locus of the subject, as well as phraseology of
questions: it appears that the phenomenon of discrimination based on ge-
netic factors may be rarer than media reports suggest. However, the re-
ports of our geneticist respondents document the existence of at least
some discrimination. How these reports are interpreted will depend, in
part, on the personal and political views of the interpreter in determining
whether the glass is half empty or half full.
Once the issue of privacy goes beyond the areas of employment and
insurance, there is a substantial divergence between the views of U.S. ge-
neticists and patients. Patients appeared surprisingly unconcerned about
many threats to privacy, especially outside a medical setting. For exam-
ple, almost all patients surveyed, reported that they would tell a school
system about a genetic test result showing that a child has a genetic condi-
tion that sometimes leads to antisocial behavior. The geneticist question-
naires said XYY which has been found to be associated with learning
disabilities, excess height, clumsiness, and behavioral problems in some
boys. The extra Y chromosome is not associated with violent crime, as
was once thought. Most of these patients said that disclosure of the test
results would help the child. When the surveyed patients were presented
with a scenario where a school bus driver had a genetic condition posing
high risk of heart attack or stroke, four-fifths thought the doctor ought to
tell the man's employer if he refused to do so. Most geneticists would not
disclose information in either case.
The responses of most patients to questions about DNA2" fingerprint-
ing was very positive. Large majorities thought that DNA fingerprints
should be required and kept on file for people charged with, although not
necessarily convicted of, sex crimes (seventy-six percent); or other serious
crimes (seventy-one percent); members of the armed forces (eighty-seven
21. E. Virginia Lapham et al., Genetic Discrimination: Perspectives of Consumers, 274
Sci. 621, 621-24 (1996); Lisa N. Geller et al., Individual, Family, and Societal Dimensions
of Genetic Discrimination; A Case Study Analysis, 2 Sci. ENG. ETHICs 71, 71-88 (1996).
22. DNA (Deoxyribonucleic acid) is the molecule in the chromosome that contains
the instructions for manufacturing specific proteins. DNA is made up of two strings of
building blocks (protein bases) called nucleotides, with four varieties: adenine, thymine,
cytosine, and quanine. These four are coiled into a helix, along with a phosphate molecule
and a sugar called deoxyribose. The genes are spaced along the length of the DNA mole-
cule like recordings on a tape. See Marcus Pembrey, The New Genetics: A User's Guide, in
THE TROUBLED HELIX 63, 67 (Theresa Marteau & Martin Richards eds., 1996).
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percent); and newborns (seventy-three percent). About half thought
DNA should be on file for passport applicants, as well as people on wel-
fare (to prevent fraud). Only when the questionnaire presented the issue
of DNA fingerprinting for credit cards, which often meant the respon-
dents themselves, was there any substantial hesitation, but one-third still
approved. In both the questionnaires and three related focus groups,
subjects were eager to get their entire medical and genetic record on a
wallet-sized card.
In sum, most subjects appeared to believe that the benignity of
medicine and disclosure of medical information extended outside medical
settings. Most people in society seem unaware of common threats to
medical privacy or to privacy in general. For example, many people will-
ingly give out their social security numbers without knowing how much
someone else can do with them. Most people are unaware of what can be
done with the information on their drivers' licenses, information that
many states sell. Most people do not know how many people, in an of-
fice, HMO, hospital, or business, have access to their medical records, or
what kinds of sensitive material, such as psychiatrists' notes, may be in
the record. In view of this overall lack of awareness concerning threats to
privacy, however, it seems somewhat ridiculous to single out DNA for
special treatment under the law. The rush to introduce "genetic privacy"
laws, while ignoring overall medical privacy, especially psychiatrists'
notes, makes sense only if one believes that somehow DNA is the soul.
What we need are laws protecting medical privacy generally, not laws
protecting just a subset of medical information. We also need laws guar-
anteeing individuals the right to insurance and employment.
In dealing with clinicians and researchers in other nations, we need to
remember that privacy is largely a Western concept, originating from the
eighteenth century Enlightenment Movement. The Enlightenment did
not fully extend beyond Western Europe and North America. In most
parts of the world people expect to know each other's business, especially
on the family and community level. John Locke's concept of the body as
property or surrounding oneself with private, inviolable space is simply
unknown in most parts of the world.23 Outside North America and Eu-
rope, confidentiality, not privacy, is the prevailing concern. Confidential-
ity, or the keeping of secrets that one has agreed to keep or which one's
role requires one to keep (e.g., the priest in the confessional), is an an-
23. John Locke, Two Treatises, reprinted in THE LOCKE READER 289 (John W. Yolton
ed., 1977).
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cient principle and widely known. Doctors, recalling their one semi-sa-
cred role, refer to the "medical secret" between doctor and patient. This
differs from privacy, however, in that the patient has no ownership rights
over the secret. The doctor may reveal the medical secret to other doc-
tors, to family members, or sometimes to researchers.
VI. ALL IN THE FAMILY: TELLING RELATIVES
Whether or not to inform a patient's relatives that they may be at a
genetic risk, against the wishes of that patient, was one of the questions
geneticists found most difficult to answer. There was no consensus on
this issue anywhere in the world. Overall, about forty-one percent of ge-
neticists, including fifty-three percent in the United States and thirty-four
percent outside the United States, would maintain the patient's confiden-
tiality and not tell the relatives. The overall number who would maintain
confidentiality has increased from thirty percent in 1985, thirty-nine per-
cent in the United States, and twenty-nine percent outside the United
States,24 but there is still no consensus on this issue. The remainder
would either tell the relatives if they ask (thirty-five percent, including
thirty-two percent in the United States and thirty-seven percent else-
where); tell the relatives even if they do not ask (twelve percent, includ-
ing six percent in the U.S. and fifteen percent elsewhere); or send the
problem back to the referring physician and let that physician decide
(twelve percent, including nine percent in the United States and fourteen
percent elsewhere). The major shift in responses since 1985 seems to be
away from telling the relatives unasked, a decrease from twenty-four per-
cent to twelve percent.
In many cases, telling unasked relatives is a practical impossibility be-
cause of the difficulty in locating them. Outside North America and
Western Europe, the majority of doctors responding would tell the rela-
tives of a patient that they are at genetic risk if they asked. The basis for
this is that they had a duty to warn third parties of harm. Many respon-
dents indicated in their written comments that they considered telling rel-
atives who asked, quite compatible with maintaining individual
confidentiality. Despite directions to check only one answer, many
checked two or three, such as "respect patient's confidentiality," "tell rel-
atives if they ask," and "send information to referring doctor." Respon-
dents explained that this was their concept of preserving confidentiality.
24. Wertz, Genetics and Ethics Around the World, supra note 9, at 16.
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In their view, only telling relatives who did not ask would be a breach of
confidentiality.
The results of the international survey illustrate the differences be-
tween privacy and confidentiality described in the section above. In
many parts of the world, the family, rather than the individual, is consid-
ered the unit of confidentiality. In these locations, genetic information
belongs to the family, who not only share genes, but will be responsible
for the care of children or other family members should they fall ill. If
family members ask about genetic risk, the prevailing thought is that they
"ought to know" or "deserve to know." The term "right to know" ap-
pears less often outside of North America or Europe. Sometimes family
members may even have a "duty to know" and to use the information to
prevent harm.
Some geneticists would pass the problem of disclosure on to the refer-
ring physicians, but they are not necessarily "passing the buck." In many
nations, the geneticists assumed that the referring physician would know
the family better and thus, be in a better position to weigh the harms and
benefits of disclosure, or, according to most comments, to use his or her
authority to persuade the patient to disclose the genetic risk voluntarily.
In the United States, many geneticists see genetic information in terms
of "privacy." This means the absolute individual ownership of any infor-
mation pertaining to the body, even though other family members may
have the same genes. The absence of consensus concerning telling rela-
tives of the genetic risk of a patient, after many years of discussion, sug-
gests that this may be one truly new ethical issue posed by genetics.
In 1983, the President's Commission, an interdisciplinary group of ge-
neticists, bioethicists, legal experts, and policy makers appointed by the
President, provided that confidentiality could be overridden if four condi-
tions were met: 1) reasonable efforts to persuade the patient to disclose
voluntarily had failed; 2) there was a high risk of serious harm to the
relatives if information was not disclosed, and the information would be
used to avert this harm; 3) the harm suffered would be serious; and 4)
only information directly germane to the relatives' medical/genetic status
was conveyed. 25 In 1993, the Institute of Medicine reaffirmed this state-
ment.26 Neither group argued for a legal duty to inform relatives. They
25. PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION FOR THE STUDY OF ETHICAL PROBLEMS IN MEDICINE
AND BIOMEDICAL AND BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH, SCREENING AND COUNSELING FOR GE-
NETIC CONDITIONS 44 (1983).
26. INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE, COMMITTEE ON ASSESSING GENETIC RISKS, ASSESSING
GENETIC RISKS: IMPLICATIONS FOR HEALTH AND SOCIAL POLICY 267 (1994).
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did, however, argue for an ethical duty and legal permission, although not
an obligation, to inform in certain cases.27 In 1995, bioethicist George J.
Annas argued that there was no legal obligation to inform. In addition, it
is probable that no case would ever meet the standards of the President's
Commission or the Institute of Medicine for an ethical duty to inform.28
They did not, however, argue for a legal prohibition against informing
relatives in all cases. 29 Some of our geneticist respondents considered
contractual obligations and argued that relatives who asked about genetic
risk became patients themselves. Thus, the doctor faced a contractual
obligation to tell them. These geneticist respondents' major reason for
telling relatives, however, was in order to avoid harm.
Patients took a somewhat different viewpoint from geneticists on the
question of informing relatives about their genetic risk. About three-
quarters thought the doctor should tell the patient's' relatives. This in-
cluded about one-third who thought that doctors should try to find the
patient's relatives and tell them even if they did not ask. About half the
patients thought doctors should tell people about their genetic risks, even
if the people did not want to know. Some of these answers appear to
stem from a belief that information is somehow a good in itself; others
stem from beliefs about family solidarity or physicians' duties to a wider
whole.
Patients took a different view of the rights of spouses or partners to be
informed about genetic risk. For example, two-thirds of U.S. geneticists
would not tell a man that he is not the father of a child, even if he asked.
Three-quarters of respondent patients, who were mostly women, thought
that the doctor should tell a man who asked, but most thought the doctor
should warn the woman first. Perhaps these patients, as first-time visitors
to genetics clinics, rather than more experienced consumers of genetics
services, have not yet heard the arguments about genetic privacy that are
so prevalent in bioethics circles. It may be that their current consensus
for informing relatives will dissolve in future years if discussions of ethical
problems in genetics become part of high school education.
27. See supra notes 25-26 and accompanying text.
28. George J. Annas et al., The Genetic Privacy Act and Commentary, Health Law
Department, Boston University School of Public Health, "Commentary" (1995) (appended
to draft of model legislation on genetic privacy).
29. Id.
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VII. My. RIGHTS VERSUS YOUR RIGHTS: THE TRIUMPH
OF AUTONOMY
French respondents to our survey often said: "My rights end where
other people's rights begin." Chinese respondents, along with many
others from developing nations, said that individuals should act in terms
of the welfare of the population as a whole. American respondents fre-
quently spoke as if their rights, and their patients' rights, had no limits.
The overwhelming majority of American geneticists, and patients,
thought that withholding any service requested by a patient was a denial
of patients' rights. About sixty percent of both geneticists and patients
thought that patients are entitled to whatever services they ask for, as
long as they can pay out-of-pocket.
In the United States, some argue that rights have no limit. Evidence
for this view is found in two cases that appeared in both the 1985 and
1994 surveys. The first case is that of a twenty-five-year-old woman with
no family history of genetic disorder who requested amniocentesis solely
because she was anxious about the health of the fetus. This scenario typi-
fies many patient requests for services that are not medically necessary.
In 1985, seventy-eight percent of U.S. geneticists reported they would
perform prenatal diagnosis, while eleven percent would offer a referral.3"
The figure was lower, sixty-one percent, outside the United States, be-
cause prenatal diagnosis was considered a costly resource.
By 1994, ninety-six percent of all geneticists in the United States would
perform amniocentesis or offer a referral. This included fifty-eight per-
cent who would perform the service only if the patient could pay out-of-
pocket. This clearly substantiates our two-class system of medical care.
The second case illustrates the triumph of the principle of autonomy.
In both 1985 and 1994 we posed the scenario of a couple with four
healthy girls, who request prenatal diagnosis solely to find out the sex of
the fetus. The couple say they will abort a female fetus. In 1985, thirty-
four percent of U.S. geneticists would perform prenatal diagnosis for this
couple, while twenty-eight percent would offer a referral. By 1994, thirty-
four percent would perform, and thirty-eight percent would refer. This
result exists despite much discussion in the bioethics literature that op-
posed sex selection. Sixty-two percent thought that sex selection should
be performed only for patients who could pay out-of-pocket. Some U.S.
geneticists stated in their comments that withholding insurance payments
30. Wertz, Genetics and Ethics Around the World, supra note 9, at 23. For a discussion
of the ethics of sex selections, see Wertz & Fletcher, supra note 12, at 21.
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had the effect of drawing some sort of moral line against the procedure.
Geneticists stressed patient autonomy in giving reasons for their re-
sponses, both to sex selection and maternal anxiety cases. The nondirec-
tive ethos of genetic counseling maintains that patient requests should be
respected, even where the counselor disagrees on moral grounds. There-
fore, more genetic counselors than physicians would honor patient re-
quests for sex selection.31
Almost as many patients as geneticists thought that doctors ought to
honor a couple's request for sex selection, though their responses to ques-
tions about abortion suggest that almost none of them would ask for sex
selection themselves.
Nonetheless, these patients and geneticists believed that other people
had a right to services of which they personally disapproved. This finding
is in line with National Opinion Research Center surveys going back to
1971.32 This was before the landmark decision of the U.S. Supreme
Court in Roe v. Wade,33 in which an eighty percent majority, with only
three percentage points variance in all those years, believed that abor-
tions should be available if there was a "serious defect in the baby," even
though they would not use abortion themselves. 4
There is also a trend toward willingness to provide services on request
in many nations outside the United States. In fifteen of the eighteen
other nations surveyed in 1985, more geneticists would perform prenatal
diagnosis for sex selection in 1994 than in 1985. The exceptions were
France, India, and Sweden. Some respondents considered the sex selec-
tion cases hypothetical in nations where public insurance systems essen-
tially regulate the availability of services, and payment out-of-pocket is
rare. Nevertheless, in most nations, with the exceptions of Russia, Hun-
gary, Israel, and Portugal, fewer respondents would accede to such re-
quests than they would in the United States.
Apparently both health care or genetic service providers and patients
in the United States agree that autonomy should be unlimited. They be-
lieve that patients should have a right to know, a right to services, possi-
bly even a right not to know, though patients are not so certain about the
last, with about half believing that people who take a test have a duty to
31. Wertz, supra note 13, at 33.
32. NATIONAL OPINION RESEARCH CENTER, GENERAL SOCIAL SURVEY, 1972-1994:
CUMULATIVE CODEBOOK (Nov. 1994).
33. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
34. NATIONAL OPINION RESEARCH CENTER, GENERAL SOCIAL SURVEY, 1972-1994:
CUMULATIVE CODEBOOK, supra note 32.
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know the results. A recent publication by the Council of Regional Net-
works of Genetics Services Ethics Committee, which purports to be a
code of ethics, reads like a paean to individual autonomy, with some
paragraphs on justice attached.35
On the other hand, the "common good" gets lost in this worship of
autonomy. The implicit assumption is that society can pay for everything
and therefore individuals have a right to everything. In practice, this as-
sumption means that individuals should have almost unlimited rights un-
less they are poor. Two cases in the survey illustrate this view. In the
first, most U.S. respondents, both geneticists and patients, would support
the decision of a blind couple to have a blind child. When the prospective
parent is described as a single blind woman on welfare who already has
three blind children, however, almost half the patients and the primary
care physicians thought the doctor should suggest sterilization, and about
one-fifth thought the law should require sterilization. Respondents' com-
ments indicated that they were responding to the prospective parent's so-
cial status rather than her disability.
Europeans sometimes snicker at American statements about "freedom
of choice." They argue that Americans have choices only for those who
can afford it. The Europeans claim, however, that laws limiting access to
some services, or even prohibiting some services for everybody, are more
fair than "freedom of choice" for a select group. France, for example, has
restrictions on donor gametes and preimplantation genetic diagnosis, re-
strictions that probably would be unacceptable to most Americans.
French geneticists, however, claim that this system is morally superior to
the American system because the restrictions apply to everyone.
In many parts of the world, decisions are made by families or commu-
nities rather than individuals; the atomized, autonomous individual exists
as a Western concept. Chinese geneticists commented that one does not
become a human being except in the context of family and community.
This reasoning leads to the conclusion that illegitimate pregnancies
should be aborted, because the child, if born, never will become a person.
Americans ultimately will have to realize that not everyone can have
everything; resources are not unlimited. One possibility is to maintain
the status quo, with poor people bearing the brunt of curtailed services.
This solution seems to satisfy many people who vote. This view is sup-
35. See generally Council of Regional Networks Committee on Ethics, Code of Ethical
Principles for Genetic Professionals: An Explication, 65 AM. J. MED. GENETICS 179, 179-83
(1996) (collection of statements of ethical practice on which a consensus exists) [hereinaf-
ter Code of Ethical Principles].
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ported by some of the primary care physicians in the survey. These physi-
cians said they thought the two-class system of care was ideal, because if
an individual could not afford medical services, that person probably did
not deserve them. Another solution would be to distribute a more limited
set of "choices" fairly, by requiring the foregoing of economic privileges
and rejecting the demands of special interest groups.
VIII. Is KNOWLEDGE A GOOD IN ITSELF?: GENETIC TESTING
Sophocles said, "It is not wisdom to be wise, when wisdom profits
not."36 The dreadful knowledge was that King Oedipus had married his
mother. Some genetic test results are of this caliber. One example is a
test which indicates whether an individual will someday develop Hunting-
ton disease, an inevitable, untreatable, fatal neurologic disease. The
Huntington test offers virtually one-hundred percent certainty, but does
not predict the exact age at which the disease will appear. Most genetic
tests, however, do not offer this certainty. Instead, like the weather fore-
cast, they offer "percent chances" of variable outcomes that may or may
not occur. Your life decisions, therefore, depend partly on your tendency
toward optimism or pessimism about the chances, partly on the magni-
tude of predicted outcome, and partly on your faith in the power of the
predictive process itself, a process that may be inaccurate.
Interpretation of risk is at the heart of genetic testing and counseling.
Unless there is absolute certainty, either zero or one hundred percent,
risk theory suggests that most people tend to overestimate low numeric
risks and underestimate high numeric risks.37 In a study of 1,369 genetic
counseling cases conducted in the late 1970s, researchers found that pa-
tients interpreted the numeric risks they were given by geneticists as
lower than the geneticists themselves interpreted the risks.38 Patients in
that study interpreted risks as high as fifty percent as "moderate" on a
five-point scale, while geneticists interpreted risks over ten percent as
"high."
Preliminary results from our new study suggest that this type of inter-
pretation may no longer be the case. Patients seem to be interpreting
36. SOPHOCLES, OEDIPUS THE KING, line 316 (David Greene & Richmond Lattimore
ed., David Greene Trans. 1954).
37. Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Judgment under Uncertainty: Heuristics and
Biases, 185 Sci. 1124, 1124 (1974); Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, The Psychology of
Preference, 246 Sci. AM. 160, 164 (1982) (explaining risk theory).
38. Dorothy C. Wertz et al., Clients' Interpretation of Risks Provided in Genetic Coun-
seling, 39 AM. J. HUMAN GENETICS 253, 256-57 (1986).
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risks of twenty-five percent or more as "high" or "very high." In keeping
with risk theory,39 some of those given the lowest risks, one to three per-
cent, tend to overestimate these risks as "moderate" rather than "low."
Final results showing changes in risk perception may indicate that coun-
seling has become more informative. Changes in risk perception also
may result from the increased availability of prenatal diagnosis and other
reproductive options which allow people to interpret their risks as high,
because they may have a possibility of averting the risk.
How people interpret risks and approach testing may depend to a large
extent on whether a condition is treatable or preventable. Geneticists
tend to assume that once a test is available, people will rush to take it. So
far, history has proved them wrong. Genetics centers are not flooded
with people requesting carrier tests for cystic fibrosis ("CF"), as was the
prediction when the gene was found. Huntington disease has not been
eliminated in one generation, as was predicted when presymptomatic
testing became possible. Some geneticists assumed that everyone at risk
would be tested so that persons with the gene would refrain from having
children.4" Before tests became available, surveys suggested that most at-
risk people would take a presymptomatic test. Once the test became real,
people acted differently. About fifteen percent of those eligible actually
got tested for Huntington disease; most people preferred not to know.
Predictions of a public stampede for cystic fibrosis carrier testing likewise
have proven false, another overestimate of the effects of a particular
piece of genetic information on public health. Apparently, most people
are interested in cystic fibrosis testing only if the issue is really salient,
39. See generally Tversky & Kahneman, supra note 38. Tversky & Kahneman's theory
of risk points out that people employ three heuristics or biasing factors to expectations
about outcomes: representativeness (the degree to which a particular outcome is regarded
as representative of all outcomes); availability (whether one can easily bring to mind an
example of the outcome); and anchoring (prior belief before viewing new information).
Prior beliefs about one's experiences with the outcome reached (a child with a genetic
condition) influence the interpretation, even if new and different information is provided
in genetic counseling.
40. Seymour Kessler, Attitudes of Persons at Risk for Huntington Disease Toward Pre-
dictive Testing, 16 AM. J. MED. GENETICS 259, 266 (1987); Miriam Schoenfeld et al., Poten-
tial Impact of a Predictive Test on the Gene Frequency of Huntington Disease, 18 AM. J.
MED. GENETICS 423, 423-29 (1984). For surveys suggesting that almost two-thirds of those
at risk would use presymptomatic test for Huntington disease, and that almost half would
use prenatal tests, see Gregory J. Messen & Roxanne L. Bechek, Integrated Use of Predic-
tive Testing by those at Risk for Huntington Disease, 26 AM. J. MED. GENETICS 283, 283-93
(1987). See also Irene S. Markel et al., At-Risk Persons' Attitudes Toward Presymptomatic
and Prenatal Testing of Huntington Disease, 26 MICH. AM. J. MED. GENETICS 295, 295-305
(1987).
1997]
320 Journal of Contemporary Health Law and Policy [Vol. 13:299
usually if they are pregnant, and a health professional suggests testing.41
Even people with cystic fibrosis in the family sometimes must be "sold"
on testing by having someone come to the home to do the counseling and
testing.42 One reason for lack of interest is that the chances that both
partners in a couple are CF carriers is rare; about one in 2,500 for whites,
far less for Asians or African-Americans. Thus, testing is not salient in
daily life. Knowledge of carrier status makes the disease no more treata-
ble; it only adds to the difficulty of decisions about reproductive options
for carrier-carrier couples who, in three out of four pregnancies would
have been equally well off not knowing their carrier status. Nothing in
the overall situation would predict a massive surge in testing unless
profit-motivated commercial forces convinced primary care physicians to
test patients, especially pregnant women, in order to protect themselves
from lawsuits.
Geneticists could have anticipated the lack of interest in CF testing
from earlier studies of families with CF.43 Family members were eligible
for DNA linkage testing and for prenatal diagnosis for several years
before testing of the general public became possible, yet few took the
opportunity.44 Most considered prenatal diagnosis and abortion of fe-
tuses with CF an unacceptable alternative for themselves, though they
thought it should be available for others.45 The knowledge simply was
not useful. Treatment seems to be doing. an "end run" around carrier
testing. As people with CF live longer and healthier lives, due to im-
provements in conventional therapies, there may be even less interest in
carrier tests.
Looking further back into history, one might have seen the future of
41. Susan Katz Miller, Few Take up Offer on Gene Screening, NEW SCIENTIST, Sept. 18,
1993, at 139; Frances A. Flinter et al., Population Screening for Cystic Fibrosis, 339 LANCET
1539, 1539-40 (1992).
42. Jeffrey R. Botkin, M.D., M.P.H. & Sonia Alemagno, Ph.D., Carrier Screening for
Cystic Fibrosis: A Pilot Study of the Attitudes of Pregnant Women, 82 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH
723, 723-25 (1991). For a review of the current acceptance of cystic fibrosis carrier testing
in the five studies sponsored by NIH, see ELSI's Cystic Fibrosis Experiment, 274 SCIENCE
489 (Oct. 25, 1996). Acceptance has ranged from one percent to seventy-seven percent,
with the higher uptakes among pregnant women. According to Frances Collins, Director
of the National Center of Human Genome Research, the public has responded "coldly" to
offers of cystic fibrosis testing.
43. Dorothy C. Wertz et al., Attitudes Toward Abortion Among Parents of Children
with Cystic Fibrosis, 81 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 992, 992 (1991); Dorothy C. Wertz et al.,
Attitudes Toward the Prenatal Diagnosis of Cystic Fibrosis: Factors in Decision Making
Among Affected Families, 50 AM. J. HUMAN GENETICS 1077, 1078 (1992).
44. See supra note 43.
45. Id.
Society and the Not-So-New Genetics
CF testing by looking at sickle cell carrier testing, now available for
twenty years.46 There is no evidence that testing and counseling,
although widespread under public health programs, have affected most
people's lives in African-American communities. Some families have
used the knowledge to make reproductive decisions; most have not. For
some reason, many geneticists thought that whites would respond differ-
ently to cystic fibrosis carrier testing than African-Americans have re-
sponded to sickle cell carrier testing. So far they have not.
The issues raised by carrier testing are not new. In the 1950s, many
high school health or biology courses taught students the pitfalls of Rh
incompatibility. If you and your mate had the wrong combination, you
could have at most two or three live children, at a time when the ideal
family size for college-educated women was four or five.47 Health and
science fairs provided on-the-spot free blood tests so that people could
know their type and Rh status. However, it is doubtful that many dating
couples asked each other about blood types. They likely went ahead and
hoped for the best, as most people do today.
In the future, much genetic testing will be risk estimation rather than
presymptomatic or reproductive testing. Having a gene for breast cancer
creates an elevated risk, but not a certainty; not having a breast cancer
gene provides risk equal to that of other women. This is unless there
happens to be some other gene for breast cancer that has not yet been
found, or there exists some environmental or dietary exposure. Currently
each test provides an "information gribble" that may be added to other
little pieces of information to provide an incomplete and uncertain pic-
ture. If the information led to proven methods of prevention or early
treatment, there might well be a stampede for testing. For example, the
fact that women can "do something" to prevent breast cancer, namely
have prophylactic mastectomies, unattractive and unproven as this option
is,48 has led to an interest in BRCA1 testing that may surpass interest in
46. For a history of sickle cell testing, see James E. Broman, Genetic Screening Toward
a New Eugenics, in IT JusT AIN'T FAIR: THE ETHICS OF HEALTH CARE FOR AFRICAN-
AMERICANS 165, 165-181 (Annette Dula & Sara Goening eds., 1994).
47. Gamma globulin injections to desensitize the mother after each birth now have
virtually eliminated problems of RH incompatibility. For ideal family size in the 1950s, see
Friedan, supra note 19.
48. There is, as yet, no scientific proof that prophylactic mastectomies prevent cancer
or prolong life. Cancer still may occur in lymph nodes adjacent to the breast. In women
with -breast cancer genes, cancer also may occur in the ovary. Report of the Working
Group of the Stanford Program in Genomes, Ethics, and Society on Genetic Testing for
Breast Cancer Susceptibility 4, 6 Stanford University, Center for Biomedical Ethics, Nov. 1,
1996, Palo Alto, Cal. (on file with author).
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CF testing.49 To date, the volume of requests has fallen short of biotech-
nology company expectations.
It remains questionable whether knowledge is a good in itself, in the
absence of clear usefulness. Although our culture says we have an obliga-
tion to know as much about ourselves as possible, this statement is based
on the assumption that the knowledge will someday prove useful. For
example, if it costs $100 to make an individual fully aware of the facts
about recessive carrier status for cystic fibrosis or sickle cell, should soci-
ety pay for this? Should society expect something in return, like perhaps
the judicious use of the knowledge to prevent the births of children with
these conditions? Or is such an expectation eugenics? The $100 estimate
is not unrealistic, based on experiments in conveying information.
Knowledge is not necessarily always a good in itself, or even a good at
all. Testing children for diseases that may occur later in life that are
neither preventable nor treatable is a good example. In such a case, the
child is presented with a "genetic destiny," unasked for and perhaps un-
wanted. Almost half of U.S. geneticists in our survey have faced such
requests, usually from parents who think the knowledge is a good in itself
and who want to do the best for their children. Most geneticists report
they would refuse a parent's request to test minors under eighteen for
genes for Huntington disease or Alzheimers disease. However, most pa-
tients and primary care physicians think parents ought to be able to have
their children tested for these diseases, based on the good of the child,
not parental autonomy. There have been statements opposing testing of
minors unless there is a clear benefit to the minor, by groups including:
the American Society of Human Genetics; the American College of Med-
ical Genetics; the American Medical Association; and the Clinical Genet-
ics Society in the United Kingdom.50 These statements point to the
possibility of lowered self-esteem, stigmatization, family conflict, and the
shifting of family resources away from a child who may later develop a
genetic disorder.51
In the future, there will be more tests providing pieces of information
and showing different levels of risk for conditions that may appear at
49. Gene Tests Get Tested, 275 Sci. 782 (1997). Fewer than half, of the women offered
BRCA testing at two clinical centers, accepted it.
50. American Society of Human Genetics Board of Directors and American College
of Medical Genetics Board of Directors, Points to Consider: Ethical, Legal, and
Psychosocial Implications of Genetic Testing in Children and Adolescents, 57 AM. J.
HUMAN GENETICS 1233, 1233 (1995); Dorothy C. Wertz et al., Genetic Testing for Children
and Adolescents: Who Decides? 272 JAMA 875, 880 (1994).
51. See id.
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widely varying ages if at all, that may have symptoms varying from mild
to severe, and that may have evolving treatments. Many of the ethical
problems in counseling arise from these uncertainties. Some geneticists
hope that very refined tests may solve many of our ethical problems by
providing greater certainty. Such tests might, for example, tell people ex-
actly the age they will develop breast cancer, or how tuberous sclerosis,
which ranges from a few spots on the skin to severe mental retardation, in
a fetus actually will express itself in a child.52 Although few medical tests
are absolutely certain, development of greater predictive value will at
least place genetic testing more firmly within the realm of medical testing
generally. In time, it may become routine to have a "multiplex test" 53 for
several hundred genetic conditions once in one's lifetime, probably in the
context of family planning or pregnancy. If the once-in-a-lifetime multi-
plex test ever becomes reality, accompanied by increased knowledge of
treatment, prevention, and responses to drug dosages, it may be possible
to plan truly individualized medicine on the basis of genotype. This
would fit into the context of "postmodern" approaches that emphasize
the unusual and the individual, rather than applying one standard or rou-
tine to everybody. 54
IX. PROFESSIONAL-PATIENT INTERAcTIONS: EXPECTATIONS
AND REALITIES
Patients in the survey and consumers in the focus groups placed accu-
racy of information and respect for persons at the top of their wish list for
"genetics encounters."55 Of general importance were providers who
know when to refer and are willing to do so, who know and admit their
own limitations, who describe their expectations at the beginning of the
counseling session, who avoid facile judgements about prognosis, who
avoid making assumptions about people's choices and values, and who
spend adequate time, including preparation for the counseling session
52. NEIL A. HOLTZMAN, M.D., M.P.H., PROCEED WITH CAUTION: PREDICTING GE-
NETIC RISKS IN THE RECOMBINANT DNA ERA 232, 232-47 (1989).
53. Institute of Medicine, Assessing Genetic Rides 297-98 (1994); see also PHILLIP
KITCHER, THE LIVES TO COME: THE GENETIC REVOLUTION AND HUMAN POSSIBILITIES
24-25 (1996), for a hypothetical description.
54. Adele Clarke, Modernity, Postmodernity, & Reproductive Processes ca. 1890-1990,
or "Mommy, Where do Cyborgs Come from, Anyway?," in THE CYBORG HANDBOOK 139,
139-56 (Chris Hables Gray ed., 1995).
55. Betsy Anderson of the Federation for Children with Special Needs, Boston, Ma.,
originally coined this term to mean any situation where genetic information is transmitted.
See Wertz & Gregg, supra note 17, at 3.
1997]
324 Journal of Contemporary Health Law and Policy [Vol. 13:299
and follow-up.56 Respondents also stressed the importance of educating
ancillary medical personnel, such as office managers and receptionists; a
team approach to care, with the patient/family as a member of the team;
ongoing evaluation of performance; communication skills; awareness of
familial aspects of genetics; and addressing all aspects, including social
aspects, of the situation. Most of this sounds like a prescription for good
medicine in general. The only item that may be more pertinent to genet-
ics than some other specialties is the awareness of the familial aspects of
the situation.
Two items of the greatest concern to bioethicists are missing from the
list of patient's responses: privacy and nondirectiveness.Y7 This does not
mean that respondents had no interest in'privacy; they certainly did not
want insurance companies or employers to have access to personal infor-
mation.5" On the other hand, privacy was not among their major con-
cerns in the clinical situation.59 The issue of privacy arose in the focus
groups only with regard to the difficulty of obtaining or transferring med-
ical records to new specialists. This resulted in the frequent need to re-
take tests, at the client's considerable expense, rather than wait for
releases and delayed paperwork. Some respondents looked forward to
the possibility of carrying their genotype and medical record on a credit-
card-sized chip.
Nondirectiveness is another matter. As explained earlier,6" genetic'
counseling has been "nondirective" in its philosophy ever since Sheldon
Reed coined the term in 1947.61 Master's-level counselors in particular
have employed this philosophy. A nondirectiveness philosophy requires
medical professionals to support whatever decisions clients make, even if
the medical professional personally disagrees with the decision.6"
Nondirectiveness means helping clients determine what decisions are best
for them, in view of their own values and goals, including their parenting
goals. Medical professionals may help clients adjust to and cope with ge-
netic conditions. Above all, doctors and counselors help clients under-
stand their options, and the present state of medical knowledge, so that
56. Wertz & Gregg, supra note 17, at 5 (illustrating the "holistic awareness and
approach").
57. Id.
58. Id.. at 40-43.
59. Id. at 5.
60. See supra Part III and accompanying notes.
61. Reed, supra note 15, at 335.
62. See generally Fraser, supra note 16.
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they can make informed decisions.63 It is considered highly directive for
a genetics professional either to tell his people what he would do in their
situation, or to tell his clients what they ought to do.' In the 1985 survey,
thirty-one percent of U.S. geneticists also rejected, as directive, the op-
tion of informing clients about what other people in a similar situation
did. 65
Although belief in nondirectiveness is the "motherhood and apple pie"
statement of U.S. genetic counseling, there is no evidence that this is what
people really want. Both patient surveys and focus groups suggest that
mostpeople would be very angry if a counselor told them what to do in
the context of reproduction, which is where nondirectiveness started.
People also would be angry if they received purposely biased information
presented as scientific fact. On the other hand, people want some sort of
advice, direction, and guidance in addition to the plethora of "facts" pro-
vided in counseling sessions. Another speaker at the National Society of
Genetic, Counselors ("NSGC") conference described today's genetic
counseling as providing pictures of foreign destinations, outcomes of pos-
sible decisions, without providing any maps or travel guides.66 People
want guidance in arriving at these destinations. They do not really want a
value-neutral counselor who acts as an information machine. Videos and
printed information, to be absorbed gradually after the session, might
better perform this function. People prefer facing a human being who
has a set of values and who cares about them and about their own values
and concerns.67 A few parent groups have even suggested that some-
times it may be appropriate for counselors to tell clients what the coun-
selor would do in their situation.68
Recently, nondirectiveness has come under professional scrutiny. Sey-.
63. See generally James R. Sorenson et al., Reproductive Pasts, Reproductive Futures:
Genetic Counselling and its Effectiveness in 17 MARCH OF DIMES BIRTH DEFECTS FOUNDA-
TION, BIRTH DEFECTS: ORIGINAL ARTICLE SERIES (1981). This questionnaire survey of
1,369 genetic counseling cases is the largest study to date of clients' .and counsellors' per-
ceptions of the context of genetic counseling sessions. Clients filled out questionnaires
before counseling, immediately after, and after six months. Counselors also filled out
questionnaires after counseling. There were no questions about ethics or about prenatal
diagnosis.
64. Id.
65. Wertz, Genetics and Ethics Around the World, supra note 9, at 35.
66. Sonia M. Suter, J.D., M.S., A Fresh Look at Non-Directiveness, paper presented at
National Society of Genetic Counselors, Inc., Oct. 26-29, 1996, San Francisco, Cal. (on file
with author).
67. Wertz & Gregg, supra note 17, at 13.
68. Id.
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mour Kessler, who has trained a generation of genetic counselors, argued
at a recent meeting of the NSGC that nondirective counseling might be
bad counseling and that the time had come to de-emphasize nondirective-
ness.69 People want and need respect, understanding, and empathy. Ac-
cording to Kessler, telling people that as a medical professional you will
support any decisions they make is highly directive because it preempts
the moral high ground and denies the client any opportunity to express
autonomy by differing from the counselor. Counseling does not change
people's views on ethical issues, a statement borne out by "before-and-
after" comparisons in our patient survey, and both client and counselor
deserve a chance to express their views.
The vast majority of counselors in North America attempt to provide
information that is "as unbiased as possible" after a prenatal diagnosis
that indicates a genetic condition in the fetus. To their credit, these coun-
selors also try to avoid letting their personal attitudes toward aborting or
carrying to term influence how they provide this information. Outside
North America, most counseling is directive: the counselor provides the
client with intentionally slanted information in order to influence the cli-
ent's decision. This is without the counselor's having suggested the
course of action.7 °
Giving purposely slanted information under the guise of medical/scien-
tific "fact" or "truth" is morally worse than openly urging people toward
a particular course of action. Clients given false "facts" have no opportu-
nity to resist. Falsification is the foundation of successful propaganda. In
some countries that offer few services for people with disabilities, provid-
ing pessimistically slanted information may serve unspoken social ends.
There was, however, also pessimistic counseling in some nations with
more advanced services, such as the Netherlands and Israel. Although
the majorities in some nations of Northern and Western Europe would
try to be unbiased for some, but not all, fetal conditions, most geneticists
elsewhere would present slanted information, especially in Latin America
and Asia. Thus, information may be optimistic or pessimistic, depending
on the condition, the culture's view of the condition, and the respondent's
69. Seymour Kessler, Ph.D., Non-Directiveness Revisited, at the Dr. Beverly Rollnick
Memorial Lecture at National Society of Genetic Counselors, Inc., Oct. 26-29, 1996, San
Francisco, Cal. (on file with author). See also Seymour Kessler, Psychological Aspects of
Genetic Counseling VII: Thoughts on Directiveness, 1 J. GENETIC COUNSELLING 9, 9-18
(1992).
70. Dorothy C. Wertz, Ph.D., Ethical Views of European and Non-European Geneti-
cists: Results of an International Survey, paper presented at the European Society of
Human Genetics, May 24, 1995, Berlin, Germany (on file with author).
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personal view about the morality of abortion. Often there were no clear
"culture areas., 71 Geneticists in Spain differed from geneticists in Portu-
gal, for example, with regard to the kind of information they would pro-
vide about most conditions. Many geneticists outside North America said
that it was their duty to present information in such a way that patients
would "do the right thing" or "prevent harm." They may have consid-
ered themselves nondirective, as did ninety-nine percent of international
respondents to the 1985 survey,72 as long as they refrained from actually
telling people what to do. No respondent reported that providing slanted
information was dishonest.
What do clients in North America get from genetic counseling ses-
sions? Apparently quite a bit of information about genetics, according to
Kessler, often more than they can absorb in one session.73 Clients also
get as much empathy as there is time for under the social/economic con-
straints faced by medicine generally. Studies by geneticists James Soren-
son in 1977-79, T7 and my own 1993-96 study, indicate that counseling
concentrates on diagnosis and risk. Both studies asked clients and coun-
selors to report on what was discussed during sessions. In 1977-79, few
counselors discussed psychosocial issues such as the cost to a family for
the care of someone with a genetic condition; the financial resources
available to the family; how providing care for someone with a genetic
condition may affect society; the potential effects of parent's marriage;
changes in a family's quality of life; or the effects on other children in the
family. 75 In 1993-96, despite the influx of Master's-level counselors
trained in these areas, the situation remained much the same. Only two
to four percent of patients reported having discussed these topics in
counseling.
Other topics rarely discussed in today's counseling, despite all the legal
and ethical emphasis on privacy, include telling your health insurer about
a genetic diagnosis (two percent); telling your employer (one percent); or
telling your blood relatives (thirteen percent). The major topics actually
discussed in depth are why a genetic disorder occurs (sixty-three percent);
treatment options (thirty-eight percent); carrier testing (thirty-three per-
71. "Culture areas" refers to geographic areas that are contiguous and share closely
related languages.
72. Wertz, supra note 9, at 34, 35.
73. See Kessler, supra note 69.
74. Sorenson et al, supra note 63, at 2-3.
75. Id. See also Dorothy C. Wertz et al., Communication in Professional-Lay En-
counters: How Often Does Each Party Know What the Other Wants to Discuss?, in 2 INFOR-
MATION & BEHAVIOR 329 (Brent D. Ruben ed., 2d ed. 1988).
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cent); development over a lifetime of an individual with a genetic disor-
der (thirty-three percent); and education for the person with the disorder
(twenty-seven percent). For the fifteen percent of clients who discussed
having children, major items discussed were their chances of having a
child with a genetic condition (forty-seven percent); and prenatal diagno-
sis (thirty-seven percent).
The topics patients were most interested in discussing paralleled those
that counselors most wanted to discuss: why a genetic disorder requires
treatment, chances of having a child with a genetic disorder, and carrier
testing. Patient comments do not indicate any expectations about dis-
cussing psychosocial or economic issues, or any disappointment that these
were not discussed. Whether they should be discussed in a really optimal
session or a follow-up session is a matter for serious consideration among
those establishing professional standards. Some practice manuals 76 and
consumer statements suggest that much of a session's time should be de-
voted to these issues.
Between 1977-79, counselors were aware of what clients most wanted
to discuss in only twenty-six percent of sessions. In fifty-two percent of
sessions, counselors remained unaware of patients' interests even after
forty-five minutes to an hour of counseling.77 Preliminary analyses of the
1993-96 data suggest that communication may have improved, largely be-
cause both parties say they are now most interested in "why a genetic
disorder occurs," a major interest of counselors in the earlier study.
Patients' ethical views ascertained through thirty-eight case vignettes
on questionnaires before and after counseling in 1993-96 did not change
after counseling. This is partly due to the fact that ethical issues rarely
are discussed in counseling. Only four percent of patients reported that
ethical or moral issues were discussed, even though the questionnaire ex-
plained what ethical issues were, as opposed to technical issues, for
example.
In a 1977-79 survey, ninety-five percent of counselors reported that
they were satisfied or very satisfied with counseling sessions.78 Satisfac-
tion was related to the counselors' perceptions that clients understood
76. DOROTHY C. WERTZ ET AL., WHO GUIDELINES ON ETHICAL ISSUES IN MEDICAL
GENETICS AND THE PROVISION OF GENETICS SERVICES, HEREDITARY DISEASES PRO-
GRAMME, WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION 63-65 (1995) [hereinafter WHO GUIDELINES].
See also Wertz & Gregg, supra note 17, at 5, 79-88, 94-96.
77. See generally supra note 73.
78. Dorothy C. Wertz et al., Can't Get No (Dis)satisfaction: Professional Satisfaction
with Professional-Client Encounters, 15 WORK & OCCUPATIONS 36, 36-54 (1988).
Society and the Not-So-New Genetics
etiology and prognosis, even if they actually did not, and to the client's
level of education. 79 According to the 1993-96 survey, "Can't get no
(Dis)satisfaction," the title of our earlier paper, is still the general rule.
Satisfaction, as before, rests on counselors' perceptions of clients' under-
standing of information. In the United States, ninety-seven percent of
geneticists would be satisfied as long as the patient understood the medi-
cal/genetic information; fewer, thirty-seven percent, would be satisfied if
the patient received emotional support but then forgot the information.
In the United States, most counselor satisfaction is not tied to whether or
not patients have prenatal diagnosis or abort "defective" fetuses, though
ninety-one percent of counselors would be dissatisfied if legal abortions
were not available.
Around the world, there were important differences in the ethical
views of male and female providers. In the United States, female M.D.'s
were more likely than male M.D.'s to say they would perform prenatal
diagnosis for sex selection, more likely to warn relatives at risk against a
patient's wishes, and less likely to accede to parental requests to test chil-
dren for adult-onset conditions.8 0 There was no difference between male
and female M.D.'s in directiveness or advice-giving.8
Outside the United States, female M.D.'s were more likely to offer pes-
simistic information after prenatal diagnosis, were more pessimistic about
disability in general (probably because they knew that women would be
the caregivers), were more likely to say they would have abortions, and
were more likely to warn relatives of genetic risk.8 2
Within the United States, the major differences in ethical views were
between M.D.-Ph.D. geneticists and Master's-level genetic counselors.8 3
Counselors were less directive, more optimistic about disability, less will-
ing themselves to abort, more likely to maintain patient confidentiality
rather than warning relatives at risk, and more likely to accede to re-
quests for sex selection.' Although this nondirective, individual auton-
omy-based stance is at the heart of counseling theory, it may also serve to
avoid professional turf battles.8  Counselors practice, and usually re-
ceive, their payments under medical direction. They are also younger
79. Id.
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than M.D.'s with a median age of thirty-four, as opposed to the M.D.'s
median age of forty-two. Counselors also have fewer years in practice,
nine as compared to fourteen, and are mostly female, ninety-three per-
cent. A nondirective stance makes it virtually impossible to be criticized
by the medical profession. Maintaining patient confidentiality is the
traditional ethic. Overriding confidentiality to warn relatives is, however,
perhaps easier for M.D.'s who are more firmly established in the profes-
sional hierarchy.
Discussions in North America and the United Kingdom focus mainly
on patients' rights and providers' responsibilities. Although it is rare to
speak of patients' responsibilities in bioethical discussions, counseling is a
two-way street. Interaction depends on patients' honesty, openness, and
follow-up. Discussion of patient responsibility is much more common
outside of English-speaking nations. Instead of remarking "patients have
a right to know" or "a right to decide," geneticists outside the United
States state, in their'comments, "patients have a responsibility to know,"
or "they must/ought to decide." Not only the phraseology, but the ethi-
cal mode of thought is different. Consideration of patient responsibility
could add much to bioethical discussion in North America.
X. ENHANCING OURSELVES: CYBORGS AND HUMAN NORMALCY
The first cyborg was a mouse with an insulin pump.86 Cyborgs include
anyone who uses a mechanical or chemical assist or implant to improve
the functioning of the body. In other words, cyborg includes just about
everyone except for people who do not take medications or vitamins.
Even so, most of us have had shots to enhance our immune systems. We
have been enhancing ourselves since prehistory, through cosmetics, ritual
operations, and drugs. An estimated one percent of American women
have had breast implants, mostly for cosmetic purposes, rather than to
replace a breast lost to surgery.87 It is difficult to find anything morally
"wrong" about such enhancements. Implants may be considered vain,
stupid, or wasteful of medical resources, but most implants are paid for
out-of-pocket so there is little likelihood that any resources are being
shifted from the poor.
Exactly what is morally or ethically wrong about breast implants?
86. CHRIS HABLES GRAY, THE CYBORG HANDBOOK (1995). There currently is much
discussion of cyborgs in the cultural studies literature and in feminist treatises.
87. MARCIA ANGELL, SCIENCE ON TRIAL: THE CLASH OF MEDICAL EVIDENCE AND
THE LAW IN THE BREAST IMPLANT CASE 34 (1996).
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Widespread use of such devices may change our concepts of human nor-
malcy but this is not commonly used as an argument against breast aug-
mentation. Similarly, use of human growth hormone to add height to
short boys who are within the "normal" range could alter the normal
range itself if the "treatment" effectively added to a boy's final height. A
wide combination of medications, such as beta blockers, pneumonia im-
munizations, and cholesterol-lowering drugs, already have contributed to
changing "average" life expectancy among the elderly. A medication that
would raise IQ probably would receive wide acceptance. In fact, we have
been enhancing ourselves for years without concern about changing what
is average and without concern about people who are left behind because
they cannot afford enhancements. Why should we stop now?
It is only when genetics enters the picture that people become afraid of
consequences and bioethicists begin to say enhancement is wrong. Our
fear of genetic enhancement is part of our belief that "we are our genes"
or that our DNA is somehow equivalent to our soul.88 Millions of people
are willing to take mood-altering drugs to improve or even enhance their
performance, but they balk at the idea of genetic enhancements. This is
true even if these enhancements would not involve the gene line limited
to one generation only. Using gene therapy to make up for a deficiency,
or for treating disease is all right, but bioethicists are afraid of using it to
make people "better" than average. Like the parents of Garrison Keil-
lor's fictional Lake Woebegone, most parents desire "all the children [to
be] above average. '"89 There may, however, be limits to what parents will
do to achieve this. The majority would object to use of prenatal diagnosis
and selective abortion to have "perfect babies," or indeed, to prevent
anything except severe mental retardation, at least according to our pub-
lic survey.9" Once a child is born, parents usually want that child to do as
well as possible and will purchase whatever "enhancement" they can
afford.
In some religious traditions such as Hinduism, it is a moral duty to be
the best one can possibly be.91 Therefore, genetic enhancement might be
88. NELKIN & LINDEE, supra note 4, at 54.
89. Garrison Keillor's "Prairie Home Companion," a popular public radio program,
used as part of its sign off from the fictional Lake Woebegone that "all the children are
above average."
90. Using Roper-Stassh Worldwide, we surveyed 988 members of the U.S. adult pub-
lic, using 20 of the same questions as in the patient survey. See supra note 11.
91. George E.C. Sudarshan, Hinduism, in ON THE NEW FRONTIERS OF GENETICS AND
RELIGION 168, 168-69 (J. Robert Nelson ed., 1994).
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seen as simply one more form of acceptable human striving.92 Asian
bioethics does not draw a firm line between what is natural and artificial
and does not denigrate the artificial. 3 The president of the East Asian
Society of Bioethics argues that we should use recombinant DNA tech-
niques to promote "artificial evolution," which he equates with "positive
eugenics." 94
The countries with a potentially positive outlook on genetic enhance-
ment, or at least with few internal cultural barriers to the idea, are Japan,
China, and India. These countries possess advanced genetic technology
and are active participants in the HGP.
It is probably only a matter of time before somebody, somewhere starts
doing genetic enhancement. As Philip Kitcher said, "it is probably im-
possible to draw a line between making up for a deficiency, for example,
susceptibility to pneumonia, and making a positive improvement over the
average, like, an enhanced resistance to pneumonia." 95
When genetic enhancement does become available, it probably will be
marketed under other names. The "genetic" likely will be played down:
after all, no one wants to be "genetically engineered." The technique un-
doubtedly will be marketed as preventing a possible deficiency rather
than providing an enhancement. If our definitions of "normalcy" change,
we will look at this as an advance. Americans already look at history and
count added years of life expectancy as a plus. Americans do not com-
plain about increases in average height or express concern that a man as
short as John Adams probably could no longer be elected president. Per-
haps such concerns should be expressed, but this is unlikely so as long as
enhancements are widely available to the middle class. It is not enhance-
ment in itself that is so troubling, however. Rather, of real concern is the
possibility of new social rifts associated with increased differences be-
tween members of different social classes.
Technologies have a way of sneaking up on us and appearing where not
expected: chances are enhancement will appear under another name, yet
unsuspected. When, and if, germline gene therapy or germline enhance-
ment ever come, it may be in a form that society has not anticipated and
92. Id.
93. Hyakudai Sakamoto, Towards the New Foundation of the Asian Bioethics, paper
presented at International Association of Bioethics, Nov. 22-24, 1996, San Francisco, Cal.
(on file with author).
94. Id.
95. See KITCHER, supra note 53, at 124-25.
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for which we are not prepared 96 For example, one proposed technique
of avoiding mitochondrial diseases, which are rare but may be severe,
would be to use the egg of a woman without the disease and to replace
the nucleus with the nucleus from the woman who has the disease. This
would provide nuclear DNA from one woman and mitochondrial DNA
from another.97 Most people think of germline therapy as manipulating
genes in the nucleus of an embryo or gamete, not as switching the mito-
chondria that surround the nucleus. Yet, switching mitochondria would
make a permanent and irrevocable change in future descendants,
although mitochondria may have little effect on the genotype, and the
procedure may have been an offshoot of preimplantation diagnosis rather
than of research on gene therapy. The procedure has not yet succeeded
in animals and may never become reality. Nevertheless, it is an example
of how new technologies appear in unexpected guises and win approval.
XI. EUGENICS AND THE COMING "DISAPPEARANCE OF DISABILITY"
Eugenics98 is alive and well in many parts of the world. In China, the
stated goal of human genetics is "improvement of the population quality
and decrease of the population quantity." Every one of the Chinese ge-
neticists responding to our survey used these words. Geneticists in many
countries, especially in East European and developing nations, also ex-
pressed eugenic sentiments. "I hate substandard life," said one woman in
India, who expressed a sentiment probably felt by many. In Western Eu-
rope and Latin America, geneticists eschew the term "eugenics" as mean-
ing a state-sponsored, coercive social program. Instead, these geneticists
use the word "prevention," speaking of this as a major goal of genetics.
Prevention is supposed to differ from eugenics because it is based on indi-
vidual and family choices. It also may be based on the purposely slanted
information provided by geneticists, discussed earlier.
Yet the history of the Eugenics Movement shows that eugenics actually
96. Andrea Bonnicksen, Ph.D., J.D., Nuclear Transplantation: Ethical and Policy Im-
plications, paper presented at the International Association of Bioethics, Nov. 22-24, 1996,
San Francisco, Cal. (on file with author).
97. Id.
98. The word "eugenics" literally means "well-born" or "of noble heredity" in Greek.
The term was coined by Francis Galton, a cousin of Charles Darwin, in 1883, as "a brief
word to express the science of improving the stock." FRANCIS GALTON, INQUIRIES INTO
HUMAN FACULTY 24-25 (1883). According to political scientist Diane Paul, eugenics has
had many meanings, including government-mandated programs, socially coerced pro-
grams, and individual free choices that, taken together, create a eugenic outcome.
KITCHER, supra note 53 (discussing eugenics).
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has many meanings. It could be voluntary or coerced; government-spon-
sored or individual; a "science" or a social policy; or based on the welfare
of individuals or based on the welfare of society.99 Eugenicists included
social reformers such as George Bernard Shaw and Bertrand Russell, and
believers in individual autonomy such as John Stuart Mill, who urged "re-
sponsible parenthood" and said that "to undertake this responsibility-to
bestow a life which may be either a curse or a blessing-unless the being
on whom it is to be bestowed will have at least the ordinary chances of a
desirable existence, is a crime against that being." 10 "Prevention"
shades into eugenics, as long as eugenics is voluntary and individual. The
word "voluntary" leaves the question, however, of how voluntary? Re-
productive choices are not made in a vacuum. Economics, women's soci-
etal roles, services for children with disabilities, cultural expectations,
availability of contraception, abortion, and new reproductive technolo-
gies all exert force on individual "choices." It may be said fairly that a
woman has no choice about having a child with a genetic condition if an
alternative is not available. For example, legal abortion is not available
anywhere in Latin America, except Cuba. The same could be said about
China and other nations where there are very few services for children
with disabilities, or in the United States where services are unevenly
distributed.
Nevertheless, "prevention of birth defects" is a major goal of genetics
in most nations. A truly eugenic goal, cleaning up the gene pool or re-
ducing "the number of deleterious genes in the population" also was con-
sidered "an important goal of genetic counseling" by more than forty
percent of respondents in seventeen of the thirty-seven nations surveyed.
Most of these were developing nations, including Brazil, China, Cuba,
Czech Republic, Egypt, Greece, Hungary, India, Mexico, Peru, Poland,
Portugal, Russia, Spain, Thailand, Turkey, and Venezuela.
For many years, "prevention" meant foregoing childbearing by couples
at genetic risk. This was illustrated in families with cystic fibrosis, where
the child with CF was often the last child born, especially if the couple
already had a child without CF.' Couples reported having changed
99. Diane B. Paul, Eugenic Anxieties, Social Realities, and Political Choices, 59 Soc.
RES. 663, 663-83; Dorothy C. Wertz, Prenatal Diagnosis and Society, in NEW REPRODUC-
TIVE TECHNOLOGIES: ETHICAL ASPECTS, VOL. I OF THE RESEARCH STUDIES 191, 193-200
(1993).
100. JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY AND OTHER ESSAYS 120 (John Gray ed., 1991)
(1855).
101. Michael M. Kaback et al., Attitudes Toward Prenatal Diagnosis Cystic Fibrosis
Among Parents of Affected Children, in CYSTIC FIBROSIS: HORIZONS: PROCEEDINGS OF
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their reproductive plans after the birth of such children.1"2 As treatments
for CF and life expectancy improve, some of these plans might change
once again. As carrier testing became available, other means of "preven-
tion" opened, such as not marrying another carrier or using artificial in-
semination to prevent the birth of an affected child. These options are
not attractive to most Americans.
Prenatal diagnosis has opened up another possibility: marry, conceive,
and then selectively abort fetuses with genetic conditions. There is no
more ethically troubling problem in genetics than which disorders to
abort. Originally, prenatal diagnosis was aimed at "detecting" fetuses
with Downs syndrome or open spina bifida, with the assumption that
most couples would choose abortion. In the 1985-86 survey, over forty
percent of geneticists in eight of the nineteen countries surveyed, re-
ported they would refuse to perform prenatal diagnosis for couples who
opposed abortion.1 0 3 Most would now perform the service if such a
couple requested it. In many places, though, it is still a matter for argu-
ment whether the service should be "offered" to people who are known
to oppose abortion. Although many ethicists' statements about prenatal
diagnosis say that genetic testing can be used to prepare for the birth of a
child with a genetic condition, 4 this is usually not regarded as its major
purpose. Choices are almost never easy. Education and training have im-
proved the lives of some children with Downs syndrome, °5 and treat-
ment has improved the lives of children with spina bifida. Furthermore,
prenatal diagnosis is now possible for hundreds of genetic conditions,
some of which involve neither mental retardation nor physical disability.
Geneticists in the recent survey stated the most difficult questions in the
survey concerned how to counsel after prenatal diagnosis and personal
attitudes toward abortion found on a list of twenty-four fetal conditions.
A majority of M.D. geneticists, both inside and outside the United States,
reported that they would abort for fifteen of the twenty-four conditions.
In the United States, eighty-five percent would abort for Downs syn-
drome, ninety-two percent for severe, open spina bifida, seventy-three
percent for cystic fibrosis, seventy-two percent for Huntington disease,
THE 9TH INTERNATIONAL CYSTIC FIBROSIS CONGRESS, Brighton, England (David Lawson
ed., 1984) (on file with author).
102. Id.
103. Wertz, supra note 9, at 23.
104. INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE, supra note 26, at 166; WHO GUIDELINES, supra note 76,
at 53-54.
105. See generally MICHAEL BERUBE, LIFE As WE KNOW IT: A FATHER, A FAMILY
AND AN EXCEPTIONAL CHILD (1996).
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and fifty-six percent for achondroplasia. A substantial minority, thirty-
one percent, would abort for severe obesity in the absence of a genetic
syndrome. A majority of U.S. Master's-level genetic counselors would
abort for eleven of the twenty-four conditions, though the percentage was
somewhat lower than for the M.D.'s. In counseling, the majority of M.D.
geneticists in the United States would be "as unbiased as possible" for all
conditions except anencephaly, trisomy thirteen, a disorder causing
profound mental retardation and leading to death in early infancy, and
where the child is not of the sex desired by the parents. (A majority of
Master's-level counselors would be nondirective in all situations).
Outside the United States, the majority of M.D. geneticists would pres-
ent purposely slanted information for all twenty-four conditions. The
information was slanted pessimistically so that patients .would terminate
the pregnancy for most conditions, with the exceptions of cleft lip/palate,
predisposition to mental illness or alcoholism, or Alzheimers disease,
obesity, or where the child is not of the desired sex. There was, however,
wide variation between nations with regard to particular conditions;
sometimes there was an almost equal division between optimistic and
pessimistic counseling for a condition. There was also substantial minor-
ity support for making abortion illegal for those conditions for which
many would counsel optimistically. Some written comments from outside
the United States gave the impression that some geneticists considered it
their duty to provide slanted information, as long as they themselves had
an opinion about the morally "right" answer. If they had no opinion or
found the situation too difficult to decide, then it was up to the patient to
decide, more or less by default. Some counseling reflected a religious
opposition to abortion in several countries, notably Chile, Poland, and
Spain.
Patients in the United States, ninety-one percent of whom were wo-
men, took a somewhat more conservative view toward abortion than did
geneticists.' 0 6 A small majority would abort for four of the twenty-four
conditions, described as "child would be severely retarded, unable to
speak or understand, with nearly normal lifespan;" "child would be se-
verely retarded and would die within first few months of life;" "child
would be born without a brain and would die soon after birth;" and "child
would have a blood condition with periods of extreme pain and shortened
life expectancy." On the geneticist questionnaire, these were Hurler syn-
106. See Dorothy C. Wertz, Ph.D. et al., Attitudes Toward Abortion Among Parents of
Children with Cystic Fibrosis, 81 AM. J. PuB. HEALTH 992, 994 (1991).
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drome, trisomy thirteen, anencephaly, and sickle cell anemia. The word
"pain" in the lay description of the latter probably influenced many pa-
tients. We included a screening question in order to allow respondents
who thought that most abortions should be illegal to skip over the abor-
tion questions. Some of the twenty-five percent who thought abortions
should be illegal except to save the mother's life answered the questions
about abortions for fetal conditions anyway. Interestingly, their re-
sponses to abortion for genetic conditions paralleled the responses of
those who did not oppose abortion. It is almost as if, in agreeing with the
statement that abortion should be illegal, they had not previously consid-
ered the idea of fetuses with genetic conditions or other malformations.
In our survey of the U.S. public, there was only one fetal condition for
which a fifty-six percent majority would abort: the child who would be
severely retarded, unable to speak or understand.
Our results suggest that while geneticists would abort for the majority
of disorders listed, patients would be reluctant to do so. There is consid-
erable room for further research on how such different world views are
mutually understood in the process of counseling, if indeed they are
understood.
In recent years, opposition to prenatal diagnosis has come from some
feminists and disability rights activists."°7 These individuals claim to sup-
port a woman's right to abortion for other reasons, but they argue that
selective abortion after prenatal diagnosis keeps people with disabilities
out of the world. They suggest that this is not only unfair, but devalues
the lives of living persons with disabilities. 1 8 They are afraid that people
with Downs syndrome, achondroplasia, cystic fibrosis, mental retarda-
tion, and deafness are going to disappear, eliminated before birth by a
heartless, discriminatory eugenics process comparable to the Nazis' kill-
ing programfor children with mental retardation.' 0 9 People with disabili-
107. Ruth Hubbard, Prenatal Diagnosis and Eugenic Ideology, 8 WOMEN'S STUD. INT'L.
FORUM 567, 567-76 (1985); Adrienne Asch, Reproductive Technology and Disability, in
REPRODUCTIVE LAWS FOR THE 1990's 69, 107 (Sherrill Cohen & Nadine Taub eds., 1989);
Adrienne Asch & Gail Geller, Feminism, Bioethics, and Genetics, in FEMINISM AND
BIOETHICs: BEYOND REPRODUCTION 318, 331-339 (Susan M. Wolf ed., 1996); Marsha
Saxton, Born and Unborn: The Implications of Reproductive Technologies for People with
Disabilities, in TEST-TUBE WOMEN: WHAT FUTURE FOR MOTHERHOOD? 298 (Ruth Arditti
et al. eds., 1984). For a response to these views, see Dorothy C. Wertz & John C. Fletcher,
A Critique of Some Feminist Challenges to Prenatal Diagnosis, 2 J. WOMEN'S HEALTH 173,
173-88 (1993).
108. Id.
109. For a description of the Nazi killings of people with mental retardation, see
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ties are saying, in effect: "Look at me. You are devaluing my life and
telling me my life is not worth living, if you have a selective abortion. 110
There are two issues here that should be considered separately before
they are considered together: disability and abortion. Abortion actually
may be the easier topic. Disability rights activists do not oppose precon-
ception measures to prevent disability, such as immunizations to prevent
rubella or folic acid to prevent spina bifida, even though these measures
will greatly diminish some disability communities. Deaf Culture, in par-
ticular, will soon diminish with the virtual disappearance of rubella
among pregnant women. Nor do disability activists oppose use of contra-
ception or voluntary sterilization by couples at risk for having children
with genetic conditions. Yet contraception keeps more people, including
people with disabilities, out of the world than prenatal diagnosis ever will.
Many couples at risk prefer to avoid having children rather than face de-
cisions about prenatal diagnosis and abortion.'1 ' In the end, the result of
all these measures is the same: people with disabilities are kept out of the
world. It is only when the measure used is selective abortion that the
feminists and disability rights activists become upset, however.112  They
argue that contraception is not discriminatory. It is the selection of a
particular "person" for destruction, through abortion, 1 3 that upsets op-
ponents of prenatal diagnosis. This disserves their claim to reject the be-
lief that the fetus is a person. Most of these arguments against prenatal
diagnosis are based on an implicit belief in the personhood of disabled
fetuses and sometimes on personal identification with these fetuses. This
leads to some twisted logic, because most opponents of selective abortion
also believe in a woman's right to choose. 1 4 If a fetus is a person, then
women should not be having abortions at all. Or does a fetus only be-
come a person if it has some special characteristic, such as disability? I
doubt that many families will subscribe to the rather convoluted logic of
the arguments put forward by this small but vociferous group of
opponents.
The issue of attitudes toward disability and keeping people with disa-
bilities from being born is quite complex. Geneticists around the world,
MICHAEL BURLEIGH, DEATH AND DELIVERANCE: EUTHANASIA IN GERMANY, 1900-1945
(1994).
110. Id.
111. See Kaback et al., supra note 101.
112. See supra note 107.
113. Opponents of prenatal diagnosis use exactly the same arguments against preim-
plantation genetic diagnosis.
114. See supra note.107.
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with the exception of Master's-level counselors in the United States, take
a generally-dim view of disability. Most do not think that all disabilities
can be overcome, even with maximum social support. Most do not think
that "the existence of people with severe disabilities makes society more
rich and varied." In twenty-five of the thirty-seven nations, not including
the United States, majorities thought "it was unfair to a child to bring it
into the world with a serious genetic disorder." In twenty nations1 15 ma-
jorities thought that "it is socially irresponsible knowingly to bring an in-
fant with a serious genetic disorder into the world in an era of prenatal
diagnosis."
The vast majority of geneticists, including Master's-level counselors,
have very little experience with support groups for people with disabili-
ties. Most geneticists probably would be quite happy to see most disabili-
ties disappear. Quite rightly, this gives some people with disabilities the
shudders as it strikes at the heart of their very being. In reality, however,
disabilities will not disappear. This is because most disabilities arise not
from genetics, but from poverty, low birthweight, absence of prenatal
care, poor maternal or infant nutrition, environmental exposures, acci-
dents, and war. Even in genetics, new mutations arise that will not be
diagnosed prenatally. With increasing social disorganization in many
parts of the world, we can expect that more, rather than fewer, children
may be born with disabilities. In developed nations, prenatal diagnosis
will keep a comparative few out of the world, but this will have a negligi-
ble effect on the overall proportion of the population with disabilities.
Nevertheless, there are some troubling questions. Many geneticists are
discomforted by requests for prenatal diagnosis for what they regard as
"minor" conditions. These minor conditions include hand deformities or
treatable conditions such as cleft palate. Some geneticists might feel
more comfortable if there were some general guidelines about offering
prenatal diagnosis in these circumstances. Should the procedure be lim-
ited to only "serious" conditions? Who decides what is "serious?" A
separate international survey of almost 1,500 geneticists demonstrated
the impossibility of defining "serious," and making lists of serious condi-
tions.116 The diversity of views, even within the profession of geneticists,
simply is too great. Add to that the potential diversity of patients' views
115. These nations include Belgium, Brazil, China, Colombia, Cuba, Czech Republic,
Egypt, Greece, Hungary, India, Israel, Mexico, Peru, Poland, Portugal, Russia, Thailand,
Turkey, and Venezuela.
116. B.M. Knoppers et al., Defining "Serious" Disorders in Relation to Genetics Serv-
ices: Who Should Decide?, 57 AM. J. HUMAN GENETICS A296 (Supp. 1995).
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and you have an impossible situation, in which the definition of serious is
perhaps best left to individual patients.
If prenatal diagnosis can be used selectively to abort a fetus with a
disability, is it ethical to turn the tables and use it to selectively abort a
"normal" fetus for a couple who specifically desires a child with a disabil-
ity? In the questionnaire we posed the case of a deaf couple who want a
deaf child, like themselves, and who would abort a hearing child. Is it fair
to deny this couple, who do not consider themselves disabled, the right to
have a child like themselves, while allowing hearing couples the right to
abort deaf fetuses? On the other hand, if prenatal diagnosis is provided,
is it fair to the child that the deaf couple ultimately will decide to carry to
term a child with what most people regard as a considerable disadvantage
when compared to hearing children? My colleague, John Fletcher, who is
a hearing child of deaf parents, may discuss this case in a future publica-
tion. A large majority of geneticists in all countries, except the United
States and Canada, would refuse this request. These geneticists cite it as
a perversion of prenatal diagnosis to use it to bring a disabled child into
the world. Is this a "eugenic" view?
XII. WILL ETHICAL CODES WORK?
Starting with the Nuremberg Code," 7 international organizations have
put forth general statements about human dignity and human rights. 8
Most international codes of ethics in medicine pertain to the ethics of
research on human beings. Individual nations have incorporated ele-
ments of these codes,' especially informed consent, into laws or regula-
tions." 9 Funding agencies have enforced these regulations through
economic control, such as withholding or withdrawing research funds
from researchers.
Codes for clinical practice present a greater challenge. Such codes typ-
ically are drawn up by professional organizations without enforcement
power. Professionals often regard proposals for codes as restrictive, es-
pecially in the United States. This is because these professionals want to
117. The Nuremberg Code arose as a result of the Nuremberg Trials after World War
II, during which the Nazis conducted medical experiments on prisoners. It was the first
international code of medical ethics and the first international requirement for informed
consent.
118. For a brief description of existing codes, see Dorothy C. Wertz & J. C. Fletcher,
Proposed: An International Code of Ethics for Medical Genetics, 44 CLINICAL GENETICS
37, 40-41 (1993).
119. See RUTH R. FADEN & TOM L. BEAUCHAMP, A HISTORY AND THEORY OF IN-
FORMED CONSENT 114-226 (1986) (tracing development of informed consent principles):
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be able to serve individual patients in unique situations. A code that
prohibited such as a specific practice-sex selection-is unlikely to be
accepted by U.S. geneticists. A code that says nothing specific and allows
many individual interpretations, one that describes different types of rela-
tionships rather than actions or principles, would likely find greater ac-
ceptance in the United States. The NSGC's Code of Ethics is such a
code.120 Another example, based on principles rather than relationships,
is the CORN "Code of Ethical Principles,"'12' which is a paean to auton-
omy. These codes have the advantage of flexibility, but inherently are
weak and unlikely to have much effect on practice. Another type of code
that many professionals find acceptable is what might best be described
as the "feel good" statement that puts forth lofty generalities with which
it is virtually impossible to disagree but which have little relationship to
practice. The UNESCO statement on the Dignity of the Human Genome
is an example of such a code.122
There is, however, hope for more concrete codes. The World Health
Organization ("WHO") recently has published Guidelines on Ethical Is-
sues in Genetics.'23 While this is a more concrete code, it is not an official
WHO publication.124 A team of consumers and providers in the New
England Regional Genetics Group also has published comprehensive
guidelines for provider-consumer interactions, including a substantial sec-
tion on ethics. 25 The NSGC hopes to develop detailed standards of
practice.
It remains to be seen whether these codes and guidelines will have any
effect. Canada is the one nation that has a longstanding professional code
of ethics. According to responses to our survey, Canadian geneticists,
however, are not adhering to provisions of the Canadian College of Med-
120. National Society of Genetic Counselors Code of Ethics, 1 J. GENETIC COUNSELLING
41, 41-43 (1992).
121. See Code of Ethical Principles, supra note 35.
122. UNESCO, Preliminary Draft of a Universal Declaration on the Human Genome
and Human Rights (Mar. 4, 1995) (on file with author).
123. See generally WHO GUIDELINES, supra note 76. The WHO document is an exten-
sive code of practice for clinical genetics, running over 100 pages and covering most ethical
problems that appear in practice. Compiled by a small group of WHO advisors, it was
designed for use in developing, as well as developed, nations. After a larger consultatory
conference, it may become an official WHO publication.
124. Although this is not a code of ethics or standard of care that only can be set by
professional groups, the NERGG includes a detailed ethical section relevant to every area
of practice. It was designed for use in training health care providers and consumer groups.
125. See generally Wertz & Gregg, supra note 17.
1997]
342 Journal of Contemporary Health Law and Policy [Vol. 13:299
ical Geneticists Code 126 that specifically forbids sex selection.
Another problem is that not only is there no enforcement for profes-
sional codes, but also codes developed by one medical specialty may be
ignored by another. As genetics becomes part of general medicine, ob-
stetricians, pediatricians, family practitioners, and internists will not nec-
essarily feel bound by a code put forth by the American College of
Medical Genetics.
The alternatives, laws and/or regulations, are unattractive because they
may be restrictive and difficult to change. In genetics particularly, laws
could serve political purposes that are not in people's best interests. For
example, Norway has restricted the number of prenatal diagnoses that
can be done each year. 127 Sometimes, laws itemize people's worst fears,
like prohibiting the creation of human-animal hybrids, procedures that no
one wants to do anyway. A proposed Canadian law forbids such proce-
dures, along with some medically useful procedures. 128 Sometimes, how-
ever, laws may be useful. France has specified the minimum content that
should go into counseling before prenatal diagnosis, for example. 12 9 In
the United States, however, legislating medicine is likely to be dangerous
for all concerned.
In the future, the most enforced codes of practice may be based on
standards developed by unseen committees at managed care organiza-
tions and based on cost-effectiveness analyses rather than on ethical
considerations.
XIII. SOME PREDICTIONS FOR THE FUTURE: AMERICAN VALUES AND
THE LESSONS OF HISTORY
Although it may seem presumptuous to make future predictions about
genetics, I would like to suggest the following will occur:
126. Dorothy C. Wertz, Professional Perspectives: A Survey of Canadian Providers, 3
HEALTH L. J. 59, 78-86 (1995).
127. K. Berg & K. E. Trandy, Ethics and Medical Genetics in Norway, in ETHICS AND
HUMAN GENETICS: A CROSS-CULTURAL PERSPECTIVE 317, 325 (Dorothy C. Wertz & John
C. Fletcher eds., 1989).
128. Bill C-47, An Act Respecting Human Reproductive Technologies and Commercial
Transactions Relating to Human Reproduction, House of Commons (Canada), 2nd Sess.,
35 Par]., 45 Elizabeth 11 (1996).
129. For a full discussion of current European laws relating to genetics, see Bartha Ma-
ria Knoppers & Sonia LeBris, Ethical and Legal Concerns: Reproductive Technologies
1990-1993, in CURRENT OPINION OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY 630, 630-34 (1993); Bartha
Maria Knoppers, Professional Norms: Towards a Canadian Consensus, 3 HEALTH L. J., 1-
18 (1995); WHO GUIDELINES, supra note 76, at Annex 2.
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1) Genetics will become part of general medicine, and the ethical
problems that seem so specific to genetics today will be recognized for
what they are: problems that pertain to medicine as a whole. This does
not mean that we will be closer to resolving these problems. It may be
that careful ethical reflection on the need for "genetic privacy" will
awaken policymakers to the need for "medical privacy" in general or that
genetic counseling's "nondirective" ethics will spill over into other types
of provider-patient relationships. It is perhaps more likely that most ge-
netics services will be provided in the same manner as other types of
medicine. In managed care systems, this may mean hurried, assembly-
line encounters that focus on tests and treatments rather than on provid-
ing information and counseling. Most primary care physicians may be ill-
equipped to provide the information and counseling needed, in any case.
Genetics will be no better and no worse than other types of medicine in
providing unbiased information or helping people make decisions. Many
will wonder why genetics was ever expected to produce superior pro-
vider-patient relationships, to uphold superior ethical standards, or to al-
low greater patient autonomy than other fields of medicine. Most
counseling will be done by obstetricians, pediatricians, internists, and
family practitioners. The small number of certified genetic counselors
will be overwhelmed by the need to understand and explain genetic com-
ponents in most areas of medicine.
2) As time goes on, the public's fear of genetics will lessen, partly be-
cause of greater education about genetics, but mostly because genetics
will come to be accepted as just one more area of general medicine. New
labels that remove terms like "genetics" and "genetically engineered" will
help to decrease fears of new tests and treatments. We already have "ge-
netically engineered" insulin, made by bacteria. There has been no public
outcry about this, partly because companies have downplayed the genetic
element. When genetic enhancement comes, it will be provided and mar-
keted under other labels.
3) Improved technologies will not solve ethical problems. Even with
tests that are one-hundred percent accurate and that predict the severity
and age of onset of genetic disorders, people will still face the same ago-
nizing decisions.
4) The future of genetics will be shaped by commerce. Free enterprise,
together with democracy, has always been seen at the top of the list of
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enduring American core values, even above religion. 13  Medicine in
America has always been, and remains, a business, in spite of statements
by ethicists and high-minded professionals that it should not be so. Pri-
vate enterprise is integral to the HGP, just as it is integral to almost every
aspect of American life. At this point, there is no economically feasible
alternative to the role of these enterprises, as government cannot support
the entire HGP. Commercial interests have a way of restructuring scien-
tific enterprises for their own benefit. This may be neither good nor bad
in terms of effects on patients or society. It may mean, however, that
some avenues are chosen for exploration over other possible, perhaps
equally good or even better avenues. We will not know the full effects of
commercialization for perhaps fifty to one hundred years. Meanwhile, all
we can do is try to be aware of avenues not taken and to make note of
them for future researchers and historians. We also can attempt to limit
exploitation of patients and the public through regulations that would re-
quire full disclosure of conflicts of interest and ensure that all tests and
treatments are accompanied by adequate understandable information.
5) The nature-nurture problem will never be resolved, even after com-
pletion of the HGP. We will learn that genetics affects vastly more areas
of life than most of us imagined. We also will learn that genetics explains
much less about our health and behavior than many people anticipated.
In the long run, it may not matter whether we solve the nature-nurture
problem. It is not which side one takes that counts, but rather how one
uses the information. Believers in nurture can be just as determinist, ra-
cist, fascist, and "eugenic" as believers in nature. Therefore, it might be
wise to put the nature-nurture problem behind us and to work toward a
society that respects human differences.
6) We will use genetics to enhance ourselves, or at least to enhance
what society considers desirable characteristics. We have been enhancing
ourselves for generations. Self-improvement is a fundamental American
value and is a keystone of American-founded religious groups such as
Christian Science and the Church of Jesus Christ of the Latter-day Saints
(Mormons). Enhancement will creep in slowly, unannounced, without
frightening labels such as "germline gene therapy," and will become part
of general medicine.
7) Some genetic disorders will become rarer, largely due to prenatal
diagnosis. Most of these disorders will be untreatable and will involve
130. See ROBIN M. WILLIAMS, AMERICAN SOCIETY: MAJOR VALUE ORIENTATIONS IN
AMERICA 454 (1970) (discussing free enterprise as a dominant American value).
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mental retardation, death in infancy, intractable pain, or severe physical
limitations. Many more disorders, however, will become treatable,
though not necessarily by genetic means. Parents who would now forego
having another child in order to avoid having one with cystic fibrosis may,
in the future, decide to go ahead because treatment for cystic fibrosis has
improved. As treatment for a disorder improves, there will be less inter-
est in carrier testing or prenatal diagnosis for that disorder. Both cystic
fibrosis and sickle cell anemia will remain with us, as chronic but treata-
ble conditions.
8) America will export its ethical values along with its technology, ulti-
mately leading to world cultural hegemony in bioethics. This is not neces-
sarily "bad" or an example of cultural insensitivity or colonialism.
Together with Canada, the United Kingdom, and some other nations, we
have some good safeguards, such as informed consent, that are not pres-
ent in much of the rest of the world. Somewhat greater emphasis on indi-
vidual autonomy and greater equality in the doctor-patient relationship
would not harm most of the world's people and might improve both med-
ical care and the position of women. Of course, we also have some ethi-
cally dubious practices, such as patenting of genes and inequality of
access to care, that we should probably not try to export. Nevertheless,
we need to remember that we are in fact exporting and sometimes impos-
ing our ethics on others, just as we do in business. This is all the more
reason to examine our ethics carefully.
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